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ABSTRACT
In this thesis the central aim is to identify and appreciate a fuller understand­
ing of possible market imperfections in the insurance market: I have focused 
on contributing to the existing empirical tests to determine the presence of 
asymmetric information, such as moral hazard and adverse selection. Further 
to this the intention is to explore and improve plausible policy implications 
in order to make adjustments to market welfare. In particular, the empirical 
analysis is enriched using ‘car insurance panel data  sets’ obtained from two 
major Korean car insurance companies.
In the first chapter I review the detailed descriptions of the Korean car 
insurance market, and the data sets from the Korean car insurance compa­
nies are presented. Then, using the Korean data sets, I implement three 
pioneering empirical models for application within the field of empirical in­
surance economics. Namely: the conditional correlation approach (probit 
model/bivariate probit model); the occurrence dependence approach (dura­
tion model); and the Granger causality approach (dynamic bivariate probit 
model).
In the second chapter I have sought to detect the presence of moral hazard 
via the introduction of a regulatory change that occurred in the Korean car 
insurance market in the year 2000. Then using logit and nonparametric 
estimation I have investigated whether there was any change in accident
2
rates between, before, and then after the introduction of a stronger incentive 
system.
In the last chapter - with an aid of an improved, more substantive, data set 
- I have investigated the presence of asymmetric information; that is from 
a different direction from that previously employed within the literature. 
Firstly, with regards to the ‘moral hazard problem’, I have worked on the 
relationship between the purchase of coverage for damage to the policyholder 
car and the stated car value. Due to the presence of a ‘missing data problem’, 
I have implemented a bounds approach in estimating car value distribution. 
Secondly, regarding the identification of adverse selection I have introduced 
a simple conditional variance test to see whether there is a difference in risk 
level across policyholders.
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C h a p t e r  1
In t r o d u c t i o n
Since the seminal papers by Arrow [1963], Arrow [1965], Akerlof [1970] and 
Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976], the ‘informational asymmetries’ in various 
market contexts have been one of the main concerns in economics. Before 
these theoretical contributions exploring the (plausibly) catastrophic phe­
nomenon, the general equilibrium theory was established quite solidly at the 
heart of the mainstream economics.
However, as Salanie [1998] points out, there are at least three major prob­
lems that challenged the general equilibrium theory: Firstly, each economic 
agent interacts between them, which is missing in the general equilibrium 
theory. Secondly, there are no appropriate considerations on the many es­
tablished organisational institutions governing economic relationships. Fi­
nally, informational asymmetries are entirely neglected. Contract theory 
(economics of information, in general) has arisen naturally enough in re­
sponse to these drawbacks in the general equilibrium theory1.
Needless to say, the presence of informational asymmetries is not only a
1 Stiglitz [2000] describes the contribution of economics of information as an intellectual 
revolution.
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theoretical problem but also a fairly practical problem in the sense that it has 
affected individuals in society on the daily basis. For instance, as individuals, 
we are more or less all dependent on the professional services - such as those 
medical and legal services provided, becoming more and more specialised 2. 
This is a very similar situation to the ‘lemon’ problem analysed by Akerlof 
[1970] since the buyers of these services are likely to have less information 
about the quality of services than experts have. Also, as an employee, most 
individuals in industrialised societies are affected by many different kinds of 
financial and non-financial motivational mechanisms devised by firms to take 
account of informational asymmetries (for the comprehensive discussions, see 
Milgrom and Roberts [1992]).
Although most economists have been aware of, and cognisant of, the im­
portance of the presence of informational asymmetries in economic activities 
and trades between agents, there has been relatively little empirical research 
on this problem; especially when compared with the rather flourishing field 
of theoretical research. This, it has has been suggested, has been mainly due 
to the difficulties of obtaining the relevant data sets to develop the empirical 
work. W ith access to the Korean car insurance data set in this thesis, I focus 
on developing empirical tests for the presence of informational asymmetries 
in the car insurance market. In both developed and developing countries, as 
the size of economy grows, the car insurance contract has become more and 
more important: for the protection of individual lives; as well as for economy 
as a whole. For instance, Jun [2000] maintains tha t there is an identifiable
2An interesting question would begin by analysing how these agents have been trading 
in this market.
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relationship between economic development and the occurrence of car acci­
dents. His report cites that a quarter million people have died, and 6 million 
people have been injured, between 1960 and 1999 in Korea as a result of 
car accidents. As a result many households have been directly affected both 
economically and socially by the prevalence of such accidents. Further, the 
social cost due to car accidents in 1998 alone is estimated to be 50 million 
GBP, which was approximately 2.4% of GNP in 1998. From this perspective 
alone the research outcomes available here - through investigating the in­
formational asymmetries in the car insurance market - provides economists, 
policymakers and insurance companies with many valuable insights as to how 
to enhance the safety and efficiency of the market.
This thesis presents as follows: In Chapter 2 I present the market char­
acteristics in the Korean car insurance market, firstly identifying the data 
descriptions that are the prerequisite for any formal analysis. Then, I present 
the empirical results from the existing implementations, of the leading strate­
gies in empirical insurance economics, using the Korean data set. In Chapter 
3, I attem pt to detect the presence of moral hazard by investigating the ef­
fect of regulatory change on the accident rates in the Korean car insurance 
market. This investigation and work contributes to a natural experimental 
approach as applied to empirical contract theory. In Chapter 4, I present 
a unique identification strategy to detect moral hazard based on a simple 
theoretical model and, subsequently, examine whether there is such a differ­
ence in accident rates across policyholders: Which will, therefore, imply the 
possible presence of adverse selection. Finally, in Chapter 5, I conclude along 
with a resume of promising directions for future research.
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C h a p t e r  2 
F i t t i n g  D a t a  t o  t h e  L e a d i n g  
L i t e r a t u r e s
2.1 Introduction
W ithin the field of insurance economics, the problem of informational asym­
metries has been recognised for a long time for the following practical reasons: 
Borch [1990] presents two fundamental outcomes in the presence of infor­
mational asymmetries: adverse selection and moral hazard, as they were 
originally termed by various insurance industries. According to Borsch, the 
concept of adverse selection was first studied in connection with life insur­
ance. During the early years of development life insurance companies ran 
their business models based on imprecise mortality tables because rating ev­
ery risk correctly was prohibitively expensive. In economics, Arrow [1965] 
introduced and popularised ‘asymmetric information’, as well as the terms 
‘adverse selection’ and ‘moral hazard’ along with the famous “Arrow-Pratt” 
measure of ‘risk aversion’. One of the first studies of adverse selection - apart 
from life insurance field - is by Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976]. The important
15
prediction in their self selection model is that there arises the positive rela­
tionship between ‘insurance coverage’ and ‘accident probability’, which has 
become a cornerstone for subsequent empirical research.
In turn, Borch [1990] remarks that the concept of moral hazard has its 
origin in marine insurance. Further he [Borsch], states it frequently ap­
pears in the related fields of fire insurance and health insurance literature. 
Arrow [1963] introduced the concept of moral hazard into economics and 
consequently announced the emergent discipline of information theory. The 
typical market outcome for the presence of moral hazard is a provision of 
partial insurance coverage to impose an incentive upon the policyholder’s 
side as Shavelle [1979] shows.
So far, most empirical research on car insurance markets has explored 
the ‘conditional correlation’ approach based on the predictions by Rothschild 
and Stiglitz [1976] and Shavelle [1979]. Along with those presented in Chi- 
appori [2000] and Chiappori and Salanie [2003], this method tests whether 
the choice of a contract is correlated with accident probability, controlling 
for observables (for instance, Chiappori and Salanie [1997], Chiappori and 
Salanie [2000], Dionne et al. [2001a], Richaudeau [1999] and Puelz and Snow 
[1994]). However, as research along these trajectories has emphasised, there is 
a ‘reverse causality’ between moral hazard and adverse selection. Therefore, 
within the static framework, it is almost impossible to distinguish between 
them except for the situation where a natural experiment can be applied (see 
Browne and Puelz [1999], Chiappori et al. [1998] and Dionne and Vanasse 
[1996]). As Chiappori [2000]points out, in practice the distinction between 
adverse selection and moral hazard may be crucial, especially from a nor­
16
mative point of view. For instance, if ‘hidden action’ is the main cause of 
the presence of asymmetric information, the introduction of a stronger incen­
tive system1 is likely to be useful and justified. However, if the selection is 
the main driving force, low risk types must sacrifice some desired insurance 
protection in order to avoid being pooled with high risk types. Thus, the 
problem is not resolved without cost as Doherty [2000] correctly points out. 
In this case, the introduction of a sophisticated risk classification mechanism 
tends to be MORE effective2.
Given these circumstances there have been some recent empirical tests 
using dynamic data sets to attem pt the separation of two phenomena. Ab- 
bring et al. [2003a] and Abbring et al. [2003b] take the contracts as given 
and concentrate on their implications for observed behaviour. Methodologi­
cally, these studies build on and extend the literature on ‘state dependence’ 
and ‘unobserved heterogeneity’ in ‘event history d a ta ’. After controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity, the principle identification is founded on ‘nega­
tive occurrence dependence’ especially given the existing experience rating 
scheme.
Further, Dahchour et al. [2004] has attem pted to separate moral hazard 
from adverse selection using French longitudinal data. W ithin a longitudi­
nal data framework controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, they show how 
Granger causality can be used to separate out moral hazard from adverse se­
^ o r  instance reductions in the amount of coverage, or a stronger m onetary penalty on
behaviour correlated with accident occurrence.
2T hat is, insurance premiums should be based on many relevant observable individual
and car characteristics.
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lection. The empirical model used is an extension of Chiappori and Salanie 
[2000] model to the dynamic environment.
In this chapter, with access to the Korean car insurance data set, I test 
for informational asymmetries, implementing the three preceding empirical 
models described so far. That is, Conditional Correlation; Occurrence De­
pendence; and Granger Causality respectively. Primarily, this work con­
tributes to the field of empirical contract theory by enlarging the applied 
area using the Korean data set. Secondly, I explore the appropriateness 
of previous models and as a result develop some alternative possibilities to 
improve current state-of-the-art models.
In section 2, I briefly discuss the features of the Korean car insurance 
market and the data set we have obtained. This review is an essential pre­
requisite before formal theoretical analysis. In section 3, 4 and 5, I describe 
the three models as implemented, and present the empirical results one by 
one. Then, briefly, conclude in the last section.
2.2 Market Characteristics and Data Description
2.2.1 M arket C haracteristics
There are four main features in the car insurance market that need to be 
understood before any formal analysis.
Firstly, there is ‘exclusivity’ and ‘semi-commitment’ in car insurance con­
tracts. Like most car insurance contracts in other countries, the insurer can 
impose an exclusive relationship on the policyholder. Thus, a policyholder
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cannot have contracts with different insurers to insure the same risk in a given 
period. Further, there is no clause in insurance contracts forcing drivers to 
stay with the same insurance company once the contractual period is over, 
or even during a contractual period.
Secondly, there is an ‘experience rating system’, which works through 
‘bonus-malus’ system3 in the ‘insurance premium calculation’. This mecha­
nism is compulsory and uniform across insurance companies and policyhold­
ers.
Thirdly, all the information about each insurance contract is public in­
formation. All contract terms and claims filed by policyholders fall into the 
domain of public information through the Korean Insurance Development 
Institute [KIDI] to which rival companies have free access4.
Lastly, broadly speaking, there are six types of insurance coverage. De­
tails are given in table 2.1 below. Policyholders can freely choose insurance 
cover amongst the coverage available. However there are some points to 
mention:
1. Coverage [1] is compulsory by law so that every policyholder has to 
buy this coverage in order to drive a car.
2. Coverage [1] has a maximum possible reimbursement. When a poli­
cyholder is responsible for injury or death to a third party and this
3Shortly, I shall explain this system within the presentation of a premium calculation.
4It was in January 1990 when ‘the rules for information circulation m anagem ent’ were
introduced. This legislation allows for government institutes to collect the information 
about all the car insurance contracts, and in doing so provide all the car insurance com­
panies with an access to this information pool.
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Tab. 2.1: Types of Coverage
1. against the injuries or deaths inflicted 011 third party
2 . against the remaining losses beyond the compensated amount made by
the coverage 1
3. against the damages caused 011 the third party’s property or car
4. against the damages or theft on policyholder’s own car
5. against the injuries or death on policyholder or family members
6 . against the injuries or deaths on policyholder or family members caused
by the third party’s car that is not sufficiently insured or kick and run car
exceeds coverage [l]’s maximum possible reimbursement - having not 
purchased coverage [2], a policyholder must pay the exceeding money 
by himself. Coverage [2] was introduced to compensate for this kind of 
loss.
3. Purchase of coverage [1, 2 and 3] altogether corresponds to ‘third party’ 
car insurance in some developed countries (for instance the French sys­
tem).
4. Purchase of coverage [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6] altogether is ‘comprehensive’ 
insurance in some developed countries (again, like tha t in France).
5. Purchase of coverage 6 is possible only given if the policyholder also 
purchases coverage [1, 2, 3 and 5].
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2.2.2 P rem ium  System
Another crucial prerequisite for analysis is to understand the ‘insurance pre­
mium calculation’. Therefore, at this point, we should explain the mechanism 
in some detail. In the Korean car insurance market contracts are renewed 
and premiums are revised annually.
The final, and applied premium, for a policyholder is mainly a product 
of four factors, these are: the ‘Base Premium’; the ‘Limitation Policy’; the 
‘Individual Characteristics Coefficient’; and the ‘Bonus-Malus Coefficient’, 
respectively.
premium =  base premium x limitation policy x individual characteristics coefficient
xbonus-malus coefficient.
The base premium is computed at the beginning of the business relation­
ship. It depends on the recognition of some observables and must be uniform 
across agents with identical characteristics. It cannot be modified during the 
relationship unless some observable characteristics change. The calculation 
for the base premium is mainly baaed on car characteristics such as car types, 
car size, car age, car use, gear types and so on. These variables used to be 
calculated by KIDI but, after the liberalisation of car insurance pricing in 
August 2001, it is now entirely up to a company’s discretion as to how the 
base premium is calculated5.
The ‘individual characteristics coefficient’ has two components: the ‘con­
tract experience coefficient’ and the ‘traffic law violation coefficient’. The
5Before this regulatory change the price of car insurance was more or less homogeneous 
across competing insurance companies.
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contract, experience coefficient reflects how long a policyholder has contracted 
the car insurance. When the policyholder begins an insurance contract for 
the first time, the coefficient is 1.4, in subsequent years it decreases to 1.15 
and 1.05 respectively. After the policyholder has contracted the insurance 
for 3 or more years, this coefficient becomes 1.
Tab. 2.2: Contract Experiences Coefficient
experience period coefficient
first or shorter than 1 year 1.4
longer than 1 year-shorter than 2 years 1.15
longer than 2 years-shorter than 3 years 1.05
3 years or longer than 3 years 1
The ‘traffic law violation coefficient’ was introduced in September 2000, 
deliberately intending to target a reduction in the number of accidents6. Not 
all traffic law violations are reflected in the update of insurance premiums. 
Research has revealed that six serious violations are most directly related to 
accident occurrence. It is those violations that are reflected in the ‘traffic 
law violation coefficient’. When there is a relevant traffic law violation, the 
maximum possible increase in insurance premium is 5% -  15%. However, 
when there is no violation within the contract year, an insurer is allowed to 
discount the premium within 10%7.
6Financial Supervisory Service (1999), “Regulation Changes in Car Insurance M arket” . 
Firstly, the serious traffic law violations th a t took place in April 1999 - May 2000 were
reflected in the contracts beginning in September 2000.
7Later, the insurance companies were to all set this percentage to be 0.3%. Hence, they
have been criticised for being collusive.
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Tab. 2.3: 1haffic Law Violations Coefficient
cohort relevant items
penalty group hit and run, drunk driving and driving with­
out a licence (more than once): 10% 
trespass of center line, over-speed and traffic 
signal violation (more than twice): 5%
bonus group no violations
trivial violations that are not recorded
The experience rating system operates through the application of a fourth 
component - the ‘bonus-malus coefficient’. The evolution of the law of the co­
efficient is identical across companies by regulation. The policyholder starts 
with a coefficient 100% at the beginning. Then, if maintained without an 
accident, this coefficient decreases more or less by 10%. There exists a floor 
for the bonus coefficient which is currently 40%; each accident incrementally 
increasing the coefficient. Malus coefficient operates in something of a com­
plex way in the case of an accident: each is calculated into the score in terms 
of the severity and cause of an accident, with a score ranging from 0.5 to 4 
discretely. There is also a cap for the malus coefficient, which is currently 
200%.
In summary, when there is no accident in the current period, and in the 
last three years, the evolution of the coefficient is given in table 2.4. When 
there is no accident in the current period, yet there had been an accident 
in the last three years, the coefficient is the same as the previous coefficient. 
When there is an accident the evolution is given in table 2.5. When there
23
Tab. 2.4: Coefficient in No Accident Case
previous coefficient applied coefficient
40 and 50 40




Tab. 2.5: Coefficient in Accident Case
previous coefficient applied coefficient
40 45 if score is 1 





is an accident, and it is either no fault, or the score is less than 0.5, the 
coefficient is the same as the previously one.
The Korean experience rating system is distinctively different from other 
countries in the world. The chief difference is that the system takes account 
of the severity of each accident, as well as the number of accidents8. The 
other difference being that it is much faster to reach the floor than to arrive 
at the ceiling. Thus it has been acknowledged that insurance companies tend
8Korea is, apparently, the only country which takes account of the severity and cause 
of an accident in bonus-rnalus coefficient.
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to avoid good policyholders because of this feature. The limitation policy will 
be explained in the data description below.
2.2.3 D ata  D escrip tion
I have obtained two panel data sets on car insurance contracts from two 
Korean car insurance companies (A and B) that have been operating since 
1983°. Company A has a market share of approximately 13.20% of the total 
market. The data set from this company covers [5] calendar years between 
01/01/1998 and 30/06/2002. This is equivalent to [4] entire contract years 
at maximum. The total number of policyholders contained within the data 
set is 607,824; samples are limited to those who are younger than 31 years 
old in 1998.
The data has [4] broad categories:
The first component is ‘individual characteristics’, this includes each poli­
cyholder’s: gender, age, place of residence (by post code), job type, ‘contract 
experiences coefficient’ and ‘bonus-malus’ coefficient.
The second part is ‘contract information’, this consists of: dummy vari­
ables for family-limited policy and age-limited policy, contract starting and 
terminating date, deductible choices, coverage types and applied insurance
9Before 1983, there had been a monopoly within the car insurance m arket in Korea. 
As the number of cars increased and the market size got bigger this system  was no longer 
compatible with the changing economic environment, both domestically and internation­
ally. Thus, to enhance the competitiveness of the m arket, the government allowed 10 
domestic and 2 foreign - [not-life] insurance companies - to operate in the car insurance 
market from 1983. Later, in 2000, one more domestic company entered the market.
25
premiums. If a policyholder buys a family-limited contract, those who can 
drive are limited to family members - prescribed in the clauses - as the name 
suggests. There is a discount in insurance premiums for this policy because 
this choice is supposed to reduce accident probability. W ith regards to age- 
limited policy there are three types: all ages, over 21 year’s old, and over 26 
year’s old. There is also a discount whereby the ‘over 26 year old contract’ 
has the highest discount. A deductible is applied to a case where the damage 
on a policyholder’s car occurs, given that the policyholder has purchased the 
fourth coverage in table 2.1. There are 6 types -  0, £25, £50, £100, £150 and 
£25010. Unless it is not at zero - 0, the policyholder should pay the amount 
tha t s/he chose at the beginning of the contract when there is a damage to 
his/her own car. Coverage types are recorded separately (from 1 to 6 in table 
2.1). Finally, insurance premiums for each policyholder are recorded.
The third part concerns information on the car. This contains car age 
(measured by the production year), car size (measured by CC), gear types 
(automatic, semi-automatic or manual), dummy variable for ABS equipment 
and valuation of the car.
The final component is information on accident occurrence. This includes: 
accident place (by post code), accident date, fault rate, loss amount, accident 
type (17 types) and car loss type. Loss amount shows the actual amount 
of monetary compensation awarded to the policyholder when there was an 
accident. Car loss type inform us whether car was a total ‘write off’ or only 
partially damaged. Further to this it also separately shows whether a car
10M onetary measurement is shown in Korean Won in the d a ta  set. This is approximately 
converted to UK pounds sterling
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was stolen.
Company B has a market, share of 4.59%. The data set covers [4] calendar 
years between 01/01/1999 and 30/09/2002: These contain [3] full contract 
years at a maximum. The total number of policyholders in the data set 
is 990,199. The structure of the data set is the same as the data from 
company A. Some of the differences for each category are characterised by 
the following: That is within ‘individual characteristics’ the data set contains 
dummy variables for marital status, and employee status of ‘company B’; 
however we do not have a contract terminating date. Also within contract 
information, we do not have a dummy variable for age-limited policy. For 
information on the cars, we only have car age variables in this data set. In 
accident records we have: accident place, accident date, fault rate, car loss 
types and loss types. Car loss types for this case is a dummy variable for 




As Chiappori [2000] and Chiappori and Salanie [2003] have clearly stated, 
under moral hazard, transfers will be positively correlated to performance 
in a less volatile way in order to combine incentives and risk sharing; while 
under adverse selection the policyholder will typically be asked to choose 
a particular relationship between transfer and performance within a menu.
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Applying adverse selection the client base are characterised by different levels 
of risk that will, ex-post, be translated into different accident probabilities; 
because of these discrepancies they will choose different contracts. Within 
the context of moral hazard policyholders will initially choose different con­
tracts for a variety of exogenous reasons: they are then faced with different 
incentive schemes and consequently adopt a more or less cautious approach, 
this ultimately results in heterogeneous accident probabilities. The conclu­
sion in both cases, controlling for observables, is tha t contract selection will 
inevitably be correlated with accident probability. More comprehensive cov­
erage is associated with higher risk types. However, there is an instance of 
reverse causality between the moral hazard and the adverse selection models.
One explanation is that the contracts induce corresponding behaviour 
through their underlying incentive structure - the incentive effects of con­
tracts. An alternative is that differences in behaviour simply reflects some 
unobserved heterogeneity across agents, and that this heterogeneity is also 
responsible for the variation in contract choices. In the presence of unob­
served heterogeneity the matching of agents to contracts must be studied 
with care. If the outcome of the matching process is related to the unobserv­
able heterogeneity variable then the choice of the contract is endogenous. In 
particular, any empirical analysis taking contracts as given will be biased11.
Most empirical literatures in contract theory face a selection problem. 
Some papers explicitly recognise the problem and merely test for the presence 
of asymmetric information without exploring its nature. In most empirical
11 The necessity of controlling for Unobservable Heterogeneity in C ontract Theory is well 
shown inAckerberg and Botticini [2002],
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insurance literatures, the aim of the test is straightforward. Conditional on 
all information available to the insurance company, they aim to test whether 
the choice of a particular contract is correlated to the risk as proxied ex post 
by the occurrence of an accident.
Puelz and Snow [1994] found evidence of positive relationship between 
insurance coverage and accident occurrence. They claim that the market for 
insurance entails the adverse selection and market signalling with no cross 
subsidisation between the contracts of the different risk classes. To obtain 
these results, they estimate two equations: firstly a demand equation for a 
deductible (as a function of an accident occurrence dummy, and an estimated 
deductible price): and secondly a premium function - as a function of various 
deductible level.
Conversly, Dionne et al. [2001a] found no evidence of the relationship. 
They argue that the insurer is able to control for adverse selection by using an 
appropriate risk classification procedure and that there is no residual adverse 
selection. Thus, the choice of deductible does not reveal any information 
about individual risk. They point out that the outcomes of Puelz and Snow 
[1994] could be spurious and due here to misspecification. In particular it 
is argued, the highly constrained functional form used by Puelz and Snow 
[1994] results in the omission of non-linearity and/or cross effects.
Chiappori and Salanie [1997] and Chiappori and Salanie [2000] also found 
no evidence of asymmetric information. To avoid non-linearity and complex­
ity of experience rating, they consider a sub-sample of young drivers and 
introduce a large number of exogenous variables. Then, they simultaneously 
estimate two probit equations: One relates to the choice of deductible; the
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second equation takes the occurrence of an accident as the dependent vari­
able. Asymmetric information should result in a positive correlation between 
the choice of deductible and the occurrence of an accident conditional on the 
exogenous variables; this is equivalent to a positive relationship between er­
ror terms. In addition, they also run the ‘bivariate probit’ and perform the 
‘chi-square test,’ for independence based on the fully nonparametric model.
Richaudeau [1999] also found no evidence of asymmetric information. In 
his paper, a ‘two step maximum likelihood’ method is used. Firstly, he com­
putes a probit model to estimate the probability of taking out comprehensive 
versus third party insurance. He then calculates the generalised residual, 
which is included as an independent variable in a negative binomial model 
estimating the probability of having an accident. It is argued tha t the coef­
ficient of this variable represents the presence of asymmetric information.
In summary, apart from the early work by Puelz and Snow [1994], there 
has been no evidence for the presence of asymmetric information.
In the following section I test for the presence of asymmetric information 
with the Korean car insurance data set using methods proposed by Chiappori 
and Salanie [2000].
2.3.2 Em pirical M odel
A general strategy for applying empirical model is described in Dionne et al. 
[2001a]. Let Y, X  and Z  respectively denote the endogenous variables under 
scrutiny (the occurrence of the accident, in this case), the initial exogenous 
variables and a decision variable (the choice of the insurance coverage). Let
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l ( Y \X ,Z )  denote a probability density function of Y  conditional on X  and 
Z. If the decision variable provides no other information we have
l(Y\X, Z) = l(Y\X) .
We can also have the equivalent form
l (Z \X ,Y )  = l(Z\X) .
Further to this, we can even have
l ( Z ,Y \X )  = l(Y \X) l (Z \X) .
There is conditional independence of Y  and Z  in the last equation. The
asymmetric information results in a positive correlation between Y  and Z
conditional on X .
Specifically, there are two probit models, one for ‘contract choice’ and 
the other for the ‘occurrence of an accident’. Denote two independent errors 
following normal distributions with zero mean and unit variance by e* and 
rji. Then we have
di — 1  (Xi/3 +  €i > 0 )
rii =  l ( X a  + rn>  0).
di is a dummy dependent variable for contract choice. In the French data 
set used by Chiappori and Salanie [2000], there are two types of coverage: 
RC and TR. The former is the minimum legal coverage required to cover 
damage inflicted to other drivers or their cars. The latter is a comprehensive 
coverage which also indemnifies damage to the policyholder’s car (or driver).
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In their empirical model, if a policyholder bought a TR contract, then = 1 
and di — 0  otherwise.
As explained in section 2 .2 .1 , the Korean coverage system is more sophis­
ticated. I have formulated a dependent variable, di, according to whether 
a policyholder purchased below coverage [3] listed in table 2.1. This corre­
sponds to RC contract in the French system. Thus, in our estimation, if a 
policyholder bought above coverage [3] in addition to coverage [1,2 and 3], 
then di — 1 (equivalent to the TR contract in France) and di — 0 otherwise. 
Also rii is a dummy variable for an accident occurrence. If a policyholder had 
at least one accident in which s/he were judged to be at fault, then, rii — 1 
and rii = 0  otherwise.
As for the exogenous variables, the most relevant ones are included. In 
the French data set they are dummy variables for: gender (1), make of car
(7), performance of the car (5), type of use (3), type of area (4), age of driver
(8 ), profession of driver (7), age of car (11), and of region (9). This gives 55 
exogenous variables plus a constant.
I estimate using both data sets described in section 2.2.3. Thus, for 
company A, I have dummy variables for gender (1 ), place of residence (15), 
gear type (2 ), ABS equipment (1 ), car age (1 2 ), job of driver (28) and car 
size (4). Overall, 63 exogenous variables are available. For company B, they 
are dummy variables for gender (1 ), employee status ( 1 ), m arital status (1 ), 
place of residence (15), age of driver (6 ) and car age (11). Thus, in this case, 
the total number of exogenous variables are 35. Insurers use those variables 
in the determination of insurance premiums for each policyholder.
Finally, in their estimation, Chiappori and Salanie concentrate on young
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drivers12. According to them this has several advantages: One benefit being 
that the ‘heteroscedasticity problem’ is probably much less severe on a sample 
of young drivers since their experience is much more homogeneous than in 
a population in which different seniority groups are mixed up: And, more 
importantly, concentrating on young drivers avoids the problems linked to 
the experience rating (bonus-malus coefficient). If we include it, the test may 
be biased since this variable is likely to be correlated with 77* in the second 
equation. To prevent this problem, they selected 6,333 samples of drivers 
who obtained their driver’s licence in 198813. For the same reason, I choose 
young drivers using a ‘contract experience coefficient’; in particular I selected 
drivers whose number of years of contract experience is [1 ] so tha t they do 
not have an extended driving record history. Given the model and variables, 
they first estimate two probits independently14. Then they compute the 
generalised residuals d; and 77*. For instance, e* is given by
e'i =  E(e,|d„Xi) = ~ ^ d i  -  (1 -  di)-v "3> ( - X i P y
where 4> and <F denote the probability density and cumulative distribution
12This usually means the most recent drivers in insurance industry.
13The French da ta  set th a t they used covers the calendar year 1989.
14They weigh each individual by the number of days with insurance cover, tUj due to
the fact th a t they have data  set in a calendar year. I have da ta  sets also in contract years
and almost all policyholders had complete one year of the contract. In case, I also take
account of this factor in company A (this da ta  has both contract starting  and term inating
dates), and I present the results for this case as well; and in my estim ation this does not
seem to drive the outcomes.
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function of N (0 ,1). Finally, they compute a test statistic by
2 ^2 - 2  ^ =lufe l r]t
It is proposed that, under the null of conditional independence cov(e;,7]j) =  
0, W  is distributed asymptotically as a x 2 ( l ) 15- This provides a test of 
symmetric information. Overall, the idea is that when there is asymmetric 
information this should result in a positive correlation between di and rii 
(described in a general strategy), which is equivalent to a positive correlation 
between e* and r\i.
After testing two ‘independent probits’ they also estimate a ‘bivariate 
probit’ in which e7; and rji are jointly distributed. They argue tha t estimat­
ing the two probits independently is appropriate under conditional indepen­
dence, but it is inefficient under the alternative. Thus, the ‘bivariate probit 
estimation’ is a reasonably complementary piece of work.
2.3.3 E m pirical R esu lts
Overall, Chiappori and Salanie [2000] found no evidence for the presence 
of asymmetric information. In their estimation, the test statistic, W, is 0.46 
which is too small to reject for the conditional independence hypothesis. Fur­
thermore, in ‘bivariate probit’, the estimate for the ‘correlation coefficient’- p, 
is slightly negative, -0.029. The estimated standard error is 0.049. Although, 
p is not actually zero it is bound to be very small.
By contrast I have generated the following evidential conclusions: For
Company A:- there are 205,627 contracts covering the contract year 1998.
15This is based on the results in Gourieroux et al. [1987].
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This covers the contracts starting between 1/1/1998 - 31/12/1998, and termi­
nating between 1/1/1999 - 31/12/1999 respectively. Among these contracts 
there are 31,839 beginners who purchased a car insurance contract for the 
first time. For this sample, I implement the same estimation as Chiappori 
and Salanie [2000]. The test statistic is 166.59, which is too big to accept 
for conditional independence. Further using the weight, it becomes 166.63, 
considerably larger than required to accept the null hypothesis. In bivariate 
probit estimation, the estimate for p is 0.2133891, for which the standard 
error is 0.0187869.
In the contract year 1999, there are 233,620 contracts which cover the 
contracts starting between 1/1/1999 - 31/12/1999 and terminating between 
1/1/2000 - 31/12/2000. I have 44,396 beginners among these contracts. For 
this sample the test statistic, W, is 154.54 which is far from accepting ‘con­
ditional independence’. The weighted statistic is 134.58 tha t also rejects 
‘conditional independence’. In ‘bivariate probit’ the estimate for ‘correlation 
coefficient’, p, is 0.1827481 with an estimated standard error 0.0170097.
In the contract year 2000, I have 271,357 contracts tha t cover contracts 
starting between 1/1/2000 - 31/12/2000 and terminating between 1/1/2001 
- 31/12/2001. Among these contracts there are 49,012 beginners. For this 
sample the test statistic turns out to be 109.19, that is again, too large to 
accept for conditional independence. The weighted statistic becomes 92.87, 
that is not so different from the unweighted one. In this case, the estimate 
for p is 0.1684491, and the estimated standard error is 0.0188084.
For company B, there are 512,365 contracts covering the contract year 
1999. This contains the contracts starting from 1/1/1999 - 31/12/1999 and
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terminating between 1/1/2000 - 31/12/2000. Here there are 69,582 begin­
ners. For this sample the test statistic is 3430.95. This is so large that we 
cannot accept conditional independence. In ‘bivariate probit’, the estimate 
for p is 0.5898179, with estimated standard error of 0.0067733.
The contract year 2000 includes 469,209 contracts tha t cover contracts 
starting between 1/1/2000 - 31/12/2000 and terminating between 1/1/2001 
- 31/12/2001. Among them there are 55,339 beginners. The test statistic is 
again too large to accept for conditional independence. The estimate for p is 
0.6324146 in the bivariate probit, the estimated standard error is 0.0069622.
Further, for each data set, I also do the same estimation for the sub­
samples classified by individual characteristics. I estimate these sub-samples 
separately and calculate a test statistic, then add these up. In this case, I 
still achieve the same results: although test statistics here are slightly smaller 
than the results for the pooling samples16.
Finally, a sceptic might argue that my finding is merely an artifact of 
the extremely large sample size of the data sets tha t comprise the study. 
To consider this critical possibility I also estimate the random sub-sample 
drawn from the full data, which is of sizes comparable to the existing study. 
The results are given in the following table 2.6, and the qualitative feature 
confirms my results from full data.
In summary, and in sharp contrast to Chiappori and Salanie [2000], I 
find - within the data set/s that I have used - evidence for the presence of
16For instance the test statistic for the first estim ation of Company ‘A ’da ta  becomes:- 
162.86 from 166.59: and the results for the first estim ation of the Company ‘B ’data  
becomes:- 3223.19 from 3430.95.
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Tab. 2.6: Results from Subsaples
data sample size test statistic
company A (1998) 6,368 46.18
company A (1999) 6,659 18.97
company A (2000) 6,372 28.70
company B (1999) 6,958 350.50
company B (2000) 5,534 375.46
asymmetric information implementing the conditional correlation approach 
proposed by them. However, I do need to mention the fact tha t the in­
surer can only observe claims, not accidents. As pointed out in Chiappori 
[2 0 0 0 ], this may cause a spurious correlation in the conditional correlation 
approach. In my case, even if losses are not affected by behaviour, it may 
be that certain losses are only covered under more comprehensive contracts 
and are only reported by a policyholder who has indeed bought this more 
comprehensive insurance! In this respect higher test statistics for data ‘B’ 
might indicate this as a plausible problem: that is since data ‘B’ contains 




There has been relatively little empirical research within dynamic contract 
theory considering the dynamic insurance relationship. Apart from the dif-
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Acuities of obtaining data sets, mainly dynamic contract theory is often in­
conclusive, or relies 011 very strong assumptions tha t are difficult to main­
tain within an applied framework. Still, there are few works that study the 
qualitative features of existing contracts assuming that they are optimal in 
the relevant context. An important contribution from Dionne and Doherty 
[1994] addresses repeated adverse selection with semi-commitment and rene­
gotiation. The key testable prediction is the presence of ‘highballing’. In a 
repeated adverse selection framework, optimal contracts are such that the 
insurance company makes positive profits in the first period, compensated 
by low and below-cost second period prices. They test this property on Cal­
ifornian automobile insurance data. According to this theory - when various 
types of contracts are available - low risk policyholders are more likely to 
choose the ‘experience rated policies’. Also, firms with a high growth rate 
will have a high proportion of new business with low loss to premium ratio 
[L/P], and therefore the recorded [L/P] for the book of business will be low. 
Conversely, firms with a low growth rate will have few of the newer, more 
profitable, policies, and so the [L/P] for the book of business will be high. 
Californian insurance companies are divided into three groups. The slope 
coefficient of premium growth on the [L/P] is negative, and significant for 
the group with ‘lowest average loss per vehicle i.e. the best quality portfo­
lio. This is both positive and significant for the group with highest average 
loss, and not significant for the intermediate group. W ith these results they 
conclude that the ‘high-balling’ prediction cannot be rejected.
In contrast, D’Arcy and Doherty [1990] identifies a ‘low-balling’ phe­
nomenon focusing on informational asymmetries between insurers: their work
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is rather descriptive; with a significantly restricted data set. Firstly, they 
show that the loss ratio for cohorts of policyholders declines quite dramati­
cally with policy age, consistent then with the predicted low-balling pattern. 
In addition, they show that the observed shift in market share from indepen­
dent agent companies to direct writers is implied by the low-balling model. 
Direct writers contractually bind their policyholders from selling private in­
formation to their rivals.
Both Dionne and Doherty [1994] and D’Arcy and Doherty [1990] rely on 
the ‘aggregate data set’.
Cohen [2005] studies adverse selection in the Israeli car insurance market 
focusing on a manifest policyholder learning process. The crucial feature 
of the market is that insurance companies are not required to, and do not, 
share information about their policyholders with other insurers17. W ithin 
this context she confirms the presence of the adverse selection. Firstly - 
examining the pool of new customer purchasing policies - she finds tha t poli­
cyholders choosing a low deductible are associated with more accidents, and 
higher total losses to the insurance companies. Interestingly, she also finds 
no such correlation for policyholders with little or no driving experience: 
stating tha t these policyholders might have had relatively little opportunity 
to obtain private information about their risk types and to gain an informa­
tional advantage over the insurer. However, such a correlation does exist for 
new policyholders who, having had three or more years of driving experience, 
have had an opportunity to absorb ‘private’ information concerning their risk
17T hat is, there is a private information structure, which is different form the Korean 
car insurance market where there is a public information structure.
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types.
The other line of the empirical dynamic insurance research takes exist­
ing contracts as given and investigates the testable properties of induced 
individual behaviour. This is due to Abbring et al. [2003a] and Abbring 
et al. [2003b]. Methodologically, their studies build on and extend the lit­
erature on state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity in event history 
data (see Heckman and Borjas [1980] for a formal definition of occurrence 
dependence). They use a French data base and focus on the role of the exist­
ing experience rating system, working through the ‘bonus-malus coefficient’ 
in the contracts. W ith this system, the insurance premium associated with 
any particular contract depends, among other things, on the past history of 
the contracts. That is, particularly, after each year without an accident, the 
coefficient is decreased by a factor of, 6, which is between 0 and 1 . However, 
if there is an accident occurrence, it increases by a factor of, y (>  1). The 
authors show that this scheme has a very general property: that is each acci­
dent increases the marginal cost of having accidents in the future. Therefore, 
under moral hazard, any accident increases cautious efforts, therefore reduc­
ing accident probability. That is - for any given individual - moral hazard 
induces a negative contagion phenomenon. The occurrence of an accident 
in the past reduces accident probability in the future. However, this predic­
tion is only conditional upon individual characteristics, whether observable 
or unobservable. As is well known, ‘unobserved heterogeneity’ induces the 
opposite - positive contagion. Past accidents are typical of bad drivers and, 
as a result, are a good predictor of a higher accident probability in the future. 
Thus, the problem lies in controlling unobserved heterogeneity. Using a pro­
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portional hazard duration model controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, 
they accept the null hypothesis of no moral hazard.
2.4.2 Em pirical M odel
In this section, I implement the estimation strategy by Abbring et al. [2003a] 
andAbbring et al. [2003b], Here, initially, I describe the theoretical and 
empirical models. It is the qualitative results of the formal theoretical model 
from which the empirical model is derived.
A brief sketch of the theoretical model is as follows: Time is discrete and 
infinite horizon. At each time t, the agent, receives some fixed income, W.  
W ith probability, 1 — pt the policyholder has an accident and incurs a fixed 
monetary loss of, L. The policyholder is covered by an insurance contract 
involving a fixed deductible, D and a premium, Qt. Thus, an individuals 
consumption for each period is W  — Qt without an accident, and W  — Qt — D 
if an accident occurs.
The premium Qt depends on past experience, specifically, the evolution 
of Qt is governed by the following ‘bonus-malus coefficient’,
Qt+i — ^
SQt if no accident 
jQ t  if an accident.
The no accident probability pt is subject to moral hazard. At each time t, 
the agent chooses an effort level, et > 0 , for some deterministic function, p. 
It is assumed that p is twice differentiable with p' > 0 and p" < 0. The 
cost of effort is assumed to be separable. That is, the agent attaches utility 
u(x) — c(e) to an income x if he exerts effort e, where c is a cost function of
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making an effort. Thus, the agent’s expected time, t utility is
v{et, Qt) = p(et)u(W -  Qt) +  (1 -  p(et))u(W  -  Qt -  D) -  c(et).
The agent is risk averse with an increasing and strictly concave utility func­
tion. The agent chooses effort levels, e i,e2,... so as to maximise expected 
discount utility, with discount factor, 0 < p < 1. That is, the agent solves 
the program
maxeij... E ptv(et ,Q t),
t
where Qt satisfies the premium evolution described above.
This is a standard optimum control problem with one dimensional state 
variable Qt and control variable et . The value function satisfies the following 
Bellman equation:
V(Q) = maxe—c(e) +  ( 1  -  p(e))[u(W -  Q -  D) +  pVQiQ)\ + p(e)[u{W -  Q) +  pV(5Q)\.
The first crucial property of the value function is tha t it is decreasing 
in Q. Secondly, it is concave18. Apart from the formal proofs, I also imple­
ment numerical analysis using the value function iteration m ethod19. For a 
numerical illustration, I specify the functional forms and numerical values as 
follows:
• utility function: u(-) — ln(-)
18Proofs are provided here on the request. Also, the final version of the au thors’ working
paper contains the proofs, which is a discrete-time model.
19The m atlab code for numerical analysis is also available upon request. For the details
of the value function iteration, there are many references. For the formal treatm ents, see
Adda and Cooper [2003], Sargent [1987] or Stokey and Lucas [1989].
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• probability of no accident: p(e) — 1 — yyy
• effort cost: c(e) =  e2
• p — 0.9, 5 — 0.95, and 7  =  1.25.
The results from value-function-iteration are given by figure [1] & figure [2]20. 
To attain qualitative results the authors derive the first order condition
,, x ______________________ <p£)_______________________
P { ’ u (W  — Q) -  u (W  — Q — D) + p(V(5Q)  -  V(7Q )) '
By defining 'ip(e) — — p(e), we have
/M  ____________________ eD ____________________
n  1 u (W  - Q - D ) -  u (W  - Q )  + piVi' tQ)  -  V(6Q ) ) ' 
Concavity of V  implies that the right hand side of the last formula is increas­
ing in Q. Since -0 is increasing, this implies, in turn, tha t e increases with 
Q. This is the main result for the negative occurrence prediction. If there is 
an accident, the agent faces higher premiums in the next period due to the 
experience rating scheme. Then, as a consequence of experience rating sys­
tem a higher level of effort is induced in order to reduce accident occurrence 
under moral hazard.
Given this theoretical prediction, the empirical model is presented. The 
analysis focuses on the occurrence of car insurance contact claims in a single 
insurance contract year, i.e. the period bounded by two consecutive contract 
renewal dates.
2()The authors have not done this part. However, this practice would be a useful supple­


































Let time have its origin at the start of the contract year: Then, if a 
contract year is of length T, it can be represented by the interval [0 ,T]. Let 
be the time of the k-th claim. Denote the corresponding counting process 
by 7V[0,T] := { N ( t ) \0 < t < T}, where N(t)  := {k : Tk < t} counts the 
number of claims in the contract year up to time t. iV[0, T] is the focus of 
the model and empirical analysis.
The intensity 0 of claims at time t, conditional on the claim history 
N[0, t) := {N(u);0  < u < t} up to time t and a nonnegative unobserv­
able covariate A, is
0 ( / | A , / V [ O , t ) )  =  A/3N{t~)i>{t)
with (3 : [0, oo) —> (0, oo) and ip : [0, T] —» (0, oo) that captures the contract­
time effects. Denote T(£) := f*ip{u)du. With normalisation T(T) =  1, A 
capturing the scale of 6. It is assumed that A has marginal distribution of G.
The parameter (3 captures occurrence dependence effects in the French 
car insurance system. Moral hazard leads to a decline in the intensity of 
claims in relation to the number of previous claims {(3 < 1). W ithout Moral 
Hazard, (3 — 1 is expected. Distinguishing these two cases and estimating (3 
is the focus of empirical analysis.
2.4.3 Em pirical R esu lts
The empirical model is estimated by maximum likelihood21. The authors 
have chosen piecewise-constant specifications of ip. W ith q > 1 pieces, they
21M atlab code for this maximum likelihood estim ation is provided on request. I imple­
ment quasi-Newton algorithm on matlab.
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then partition the contract year, [0,7"], in q equally-sized intervals with ip 
constant on each interval thus:
#o = X ^ /(:hr:-?<„)’
j=i H
with 7/h, 'ipq > 0  parameters to be estimated up to the normalisation 
<S(T) = (T /q ) Y ,%  ip3 = 1 . For the distribution of A t h e y  use discrete 
distribution with two points of support. In this case they estimate the sup­
port points, A°, A6 > 0, and one probability, Pr(A =  Aa) — 1 — Pr(A =  A6).
The authors use the insurance contracts from a French insurance company 
for a given and common calendar time period of two years, October 1 , 1987 
- September 30, 1989.
Tab. 2.7: French Data
number of observations by number of claims
Afo,n(no claims) 74566
M itn(l claim) 4831
A7 2 ! n ( 2  claims) 270
M3j„(3 claims) 15
A74,n(4 claims) 2
Overall, using their own data set, they found no evidence of moral hazard. 
The estimate for f3 is 0.974 with an estimated standard error of 0.677. With 
regard to contract time effects, they do not reject the stationarity.
Conversely, I have detected the negative occurrence dependence phe­
nomenon. I present here my results for the 1998 data set of Company [A] 
and the 1999 data set of Company [B] in table 9 and in table 10. In the
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appendix A .l, I present the remaining results for other contract years in 
both data sets22. However, there should be some caution exercised in the 
interpretation of empirical results. As presented in section 2.2.2, the Ko­
rean experience rating system is markedly different from the French system: 
which is a proportional system23. This implies that when I apply [the French] 
theory to the Korean data set this would suggests a possible changes in the 
interpretation of Abbring et al. [2003b]’s test for moral hazard. Particularly, 
depending on the policyholder’s current experience rating state, under the 
presence of moral hazard, individual claim rates may also depend positively 
on the past claim if the experience rating system is nonproportional.
Further, as in the previous section, I estimate with sub-samples to see 
whether the sample size makes a difference to the results: especially with 
regard to t-values. In this exercise I construct sub-samples according to 
individual characteristics. In the following tables below are presented the 
results; here only coefficient /?s are reported and we can clearly see that 
sample size does not make a difference.
Here I like to point out one thing regarding our results. In case of the 
year 2000 data set of Company [A] the estimated (3 is very small, being close 
to zero. This seems to be driven by the contracts-time effects.
22I also estim ate sub-samples classified by some individual characteristics. I have divided 
the samples for Company [A] using ‘gender’ and for Company [B] using ‘gender, marital 
status and age’. For these estimations, I have produced similar results to the pooled-data-
sets; some results are presented in table 2.8.
23This is described in section 2.4.1 in details. Basically, the Korean system is nonpro­
portional and much more complicated due to taking account of the severity of an accident 
as well as the number of accidents.
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Tab. 2.8: Results from Subsamples
data subsample sample size coefficient /I
A (1998) female M 0: 29,448 
M i: 2,498 
M 2: 173 
M 3: 17 
M 4: 1
0.4978 (0.1060)
B (2000) married male & 
18< age <40
M 0: 70,068 
M i: 7,515 
M 2: 1,017 
M 3: 127 
M 4: 35
0.4325 (0.0318)
B (2000) unmarried female & 
age > 40
M 0: 15,559 
M i: 2,025 
M 2: 268 
M 3: 33 
M 4: 5
0.4886 (0.0892)
(standard errors are in parenthesis)
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number of observations by number of claims
Afojn,(no claims) 182441
M i,n (l claim) 12100
A/2 ,n ( 2  claims) 776











Pr(A =  Aa ) 0.965(0.0835)





i ’ 4 1.0325(0.0163)
bs 1.0245(0.0162)
bo 1.0184(0.0162)





number of observations by number of claims
Mo)n(no claims) 396729
A/i,n (l claim) 40635
A/2 ,n (2 claims) 4148
A/3 ,n (3 claims) 521





Abbring et al. [2003a] and Abbring et al. [2003b] have indeed made progress 
beyond the established static framework in attempting to distinguish two 
major phenomena in informational asymmetries. However, due to data lim­
itations, they focus on the dynamics of the claims, and therefore not on the 
dynamics of contract choices. Given that, and applying specific assumptions 
about the wealth effects of accidents to policyholders who differ only in their 
claim records (and thus their experience rating), their model predicts that 
policyholders with worse claim records should try harder to drive carefully, 
and, ceteris paribus, file fewer claims in the future. Yet, they do not detect 
the presence of Moral Hazard.
Dahchour et al. [2004] proposes a methodology to disentangle the histori­
cal pathways which lead asymmetric information to a conditional correlation 
between the claims and the levels of coverage. Using a French longitudinal 
framework controlling for unobservables, they show how Granger causality 
can be used to disentangle moral hazard from adverse selection. They apply 
a dynamic bivariate probit model here as an empirical model.
2.5.2 Em pirical M odel
Basically, the model is an extension of the static bivariate probit model 
proposed in Chiappori and Salanie [2000]. Let us consider the case where 
we have 7* repeated observations on a contract (assume T) =  T). We can
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decompose the error terms in the static framework (see the error terms in 
choice equations from section 2.3.2) into an error component structure
Q — a di +  edit
'Hi — T tn i t -
Assume that the econometrician, insurance companies, and policyholders 
can observe the pair cq =  where represents specific contract
characteristics and a ni represents specific policyholder characteristics. The 
test for asymmetric information then adopts the form:
H0 : F{dit,nit\xit ,OLi,0) =  F(dit\x.it, ap 9d)F(nit\xit, a*; 6n)\/t,
where F  is the cumulative distribution function.
Now include the history of each of the decision variables in the condition­
ing set such that:-
Ho • F(dit, Tlit\'Kit1 dn— x, Tlit—ii Cq, $) — F (d^|x^, dn — \  ^ -^ii @d) ^
F{jlit\~X-it 1 dit— 1 , Tlit — \ 1 C^ii ^n)Vt 1 .
This still yields a test for residual asymmetric information given by the 
null hypothesis pe — 0, where pe =  Cov[e^, en^j. Looking at the marginals, 
the authors claim that the cross-sectional variation in contract choice da- 1 , 
holding a  and n i t - 1 constant, effectively identifies the presence of moral haz­
ard if nit responds positively to such a variation. Under pure adverse selec­
tion, such variation in contract choice will not lead to a subsequent change in 
the distribution of claims in the next period. Thus, they propose to test for
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the presence of moral hazard by using Granger causality, crucially holding a 
fixed. Then, rejecting the null hypothesis:-
Hq ; F d n —\  ^Tiit—ii (y.ii 0 ^  — F(riit\x-iti Tin—\ , Ony^t >  1
will lead them to conclude that there is evidence of dynamic moral hazard.
One can distinguish moral hazard from adverse selection within this dy­
namic framework because changes in exogenous risk factors (adverse selec­
tion) are controlled over time. Therefore, access to longitudinal data is cru­
cial. Since a  is not observable and the cross-sectional variation in di t - 1  and 
Tin-i is correlated with unobserved heterogeneity, one additional observation 
is needed in order to have two pairs of (nit, do) and (n^_i, da- 1 ) from which 
we can separate the effect of unobserved heterogeneity. This is analogous to 
the identification argument that Heckman [1981] make for a dynamic binary 
choice model with an error component structure.
Given the discussion above, the parametric model for the evolution of 
claims and contract choice is given by
I 1 if djj. X /^3  ^T Wn'Jd T (fidddit— 1 T (f^dn^it — 1 T Otdi T Cdit ^  0
dlt =  <
I 0  otherwise
II if Tljj. X /^3n + W^yn (pnn^it — l T 4*nddit—l T  C^ni T &nit 00  otherwise i =  1 , =  1 ,..., Tf
Xit is a vector of the policyholder’s characteristics tha t are observable 
to both insurance company and policyholder. w it is a set of variables that
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are predetermined at t, such that E(efz?;(w ^+S) =  0 and E(enitw it+S) — 0 are 
assumed to hold for s — 0 but may not necessarily hold for s > 1. This 
plausibly allows for feedback from accidents and contract choice to certain 
variables such as the bonus-malus coefficient.
The dynamic test for moral hazard is:
Ho ■ 5: 0
Hi • (ftnd  ^  0 ,
while the contemporaneous test for residual asymmetric information24 is 
given by
Ho : Pe < 0  
H i : p e >  0.
For a small panel, predetermining the binary choice with an error component 
structure will lead to the ‘initial condition problem’. Since are
unobserved, they must be integrated out from the conditional probabilities. 
Because contracts have a prior history which is hidden for the econometrician, 
it therefore requires an attem pt to sort out the joint density of (a^ , a ni) and 
the prior initial conditions since dio and are missing25.
Authors follow the solution proposed by Wooldridge [2005] and, as a 
result, assume the mean of the distribution of (cr^, OLni) t°  be a linear in­
dex y'iCd and y'iCn of endogenous variables and predetermined variables:
24Residual asymmetric information is interpreted as asym m etric inform ation after con­
trolling for all the observables.
25Wooldridge [2005] discusses th a t even when the econometrician has access to the entire
history of the process, the problem still remains unresolved!
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y.j =  (rfji, riji, Wii)'. The parameters Q and (n do not capture causal effects 
and therefore cannot be used to test any of the relevant sources of asym­
metric information. W ith this solution, we can decompose the unobserved 
heterogeneities by
&di VilCd T ^di
Ot-ni Vi\Qn T ^ni■
Replacing unobserved heterogeneity by their conditional means with error 
terms yields the following equations:-
II d*t =  y i^tfid +  +  (frdddit- 1 +  ^dn^it- 1 +  y'nC,d +  Wdi +  Cdit > 00 otherwise
II if Tift ~X.itPn T T —1 T (find^H-l T VuCn T ni T ^nit -'> 00 otherwise i =  1, = 2,
2.5.3 Em pirical R esu lts
The authors use the SOFRES longitudinal survey covering representative 
samples of French drivers from 1995 to 1997 (3 years). The information 
available in the database is composed of three elements: The first concerns 
information on driver characteristics: The second covers the vehicles: The 
third provides the bonus-malus coefficient, and the type of insurance cover­
age. Given this data structure, they use the unbalanced panel to improve the
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efficiency of the estimator although the identification of moral hazard will be 
mainly derived from contracts observed over three years; the total of these 
contracts is 1,049.
By implementing the empirical model26, first of all, they found no evi­
dence of residual asymmetric information. The coefficient, pe, is quite low,
0.014 and imprecisely estimated (t-value = 0.25). However, they did find 
evidence of dynamic moral hazard the estimate for 0nc/ being 0.409. Indeed, 
they find that those switching from comprehensive coverage to third-party 
coverage tend to exhibit a 5.9 percentage point decrease in the probability 
that they will file a claim the next year. Finally, interestingly, they found 
the evidence of a positive contagion effect (positive state dependence) in the 
claim process. A policyholder filing a claim in a given period is 6.1% more 
likely to file another claim in the next year compared with another policy­
holder with a comparable risk profile who did not file a claim. This implies 
that not finding a negative contagion effect does not necessarily imply that 
moral hazard is absent under the experience rating system (compare with 
Abbring et al. [2003b]).
I use the data set from Company [B] for this estimation. As mentioned 
in the data description, this data set covers [4] calendar years from 1999 to 
2002. Unlike the authors I use the balanced panel, since I have enough con­
tracts that stayed for the entire time period. From this data set I have 11,645 
contracts - equivalent to 34,935 observations - which remained for [4] years. 
For the random terms in the replacement of the unobserved heterogeneities, I
26They do not report the estimates for two random term s in the replacement of the 
unobserved heterogeneities.
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assume that they follow a bivariate discrete distribution (see appendix). Ac­
cording to Michaud and Tatsiramos [2005], using a mass point heterogeneity 
distribution is an attractive alternative to parametric distributions. It is non­
par ametric and, particularly, the parametric alternative involves numerical 
methods that are not always precise when persistence is high. I implement 
the given model using a maximum likelihood estimation27.
I partition the samples according to places of residence28. W ith this 
method, I have 13 sub-samples. In most estimations, I found out evidence 
of both residual (contemporaneous) asymmetric information and dynamic 
moral hazard. Here, I present the results for those who live in Seoul, the 
capital city in Korea. The remaining 12 results for other provinces are pre­
sented in appendix A.3.
As can seen in the table 2.11, my estimated ‘rho’ is 0.1238. That shows 
positive correlation between two contemporaneous error terms, which is dif­
ferent from the authors’ results (but consistent with our results from the 
conditional correlation approach). Furthermore, the estimated coefficient, 
(f)nd, is 0.6118 (coefficient for LAGCON in our estimation). That is, there is 
a reduction in the future probability of filing a claim with regard to the de­
crease in coverage from the previous period. Also, in my case, there arises a 
positive state dependence phenomenon in the claim process. This is shown by
27M atlab code is again available on request. We implement a sequential quadratic
programming (SQP) m ethod using a quasi Newton algorithm.
28This is mainly due to technical considerations. In our case, the num ber of param eters
to be estim ated is 68 and the sample size is 34,935. Thus, it was not feasible to estim ate 
the pooled sample. This method does have an advantage though: th a t is we could see 
some differences across the provinces in Korea regarding the aims of the estimation.
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the estimated coefficient for LAGCLA in the claim equation. The estimated 
coefficient is 0.1747, which shows the positive contagion effect.
Although 1 found out the evidence of contemporaneous asymmetric infor­
mation and dynamic moral hazard, identification of the latter in the model 
would be neither strong nor obvious. Particularly, whether the effects of 
lagged contract choices on the current claims corresponding to moral hazard 
effects is not obvious. As the authors stated, what would be informative 
may be the effects of the changes in contract choices between the previous 
period and the current period on current accident occurrence. In this regard 
an alternative model specification should be considered like.
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2.6 Conclusion
Empirical contract theory has explored and studied many interesting eco­
nomic phenomena with regard to informational asymmetries in the various 
market contexts. Also, this research area has constantly attracted the enthu­
siastic attentions from many economists. As described in the introduction, 
this interest reflects the fact that empirical research within contract theory 
compared with theoretical research in this area is lagging behind somewhat. 
Furthermore, and more importantly, economists have also realised that eco­
nomic agents involved in the trades have become aware of the practical impor­
tance, and considerable welfare implications, of informational asymmetries.
In this chapter, with the availability of the Korean car insurance data 
set, I have focused on empirical aspects of insurance economics. Mainly, I 
have implemented the most path breaking empirical models in the empirical 
insurance literature.
First of all, I have sought to implement the conditional correlation ap­
proach. From this endeavour I have generated fairly interesting results. Un­
like the most research tha t has applied similar methods (particularly, Chiap- 
pori and Salanie [2000]), I have discovered evidence for the presence of the 
asymmetric information within static frameworks.
Detecting the presence of the asymmetric information in terms of the po­
tential application of the above research for welfare implications is neither 
sufficient nor comprehensive enough, as far as the involved trading parties 
are concerned. As I mentioned in the introduction, depending on the ‘cause’ 
of the information asymmetries, there should be different policy reactions.
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In this regard there has been, recently, some pioneering research that has 
explored the possibilities of distinguishing two major phenomena: adverse 
selection and moral hazard, especially within the context of dynamic con­
tractual relationship.
Therefore, secondly - and with regard to dynamic empirical contract the­
ory - I have applied occurrence dependence methodology. As a result of 
this enquiry I discovered the negative occurrence dependence phenomenon 
which is different from the provision of ‘no moral hazard’ from Abbring et al. 
[2003b],
Finally, I have implemented the model based on Granger causality. This 
methodology has been made possible with useful panel data set. In accor­
dance with Dahchour et al. [2004], I have been able to find evidence for the 
presence of dynamic moral hazard.
Overall, in virtually all my implementations, I have consistently discov­
ered evidence for the presence of asymmetric information in the static frame­
work, and evidence of dynamic moral hazard in the dynamic framework. 
However, we should be cautious here: That is we may not be entirely sure 
whether these results are a necessary consequence of the apparent existence 
of informational asymmetries within the Korean car insurance market or 
derived completely from misspecifications of the empirical models we have 
employed. Therefore, I would need a more diversified research approach, 
based on the different strategies, using enriched Korean car insurance data 
sets in order to further pursue this empirical research.
As previously mentioned in the introduction, I launch the ‘natural ex­
periment’ research project exploiting the regulation change in 2000 in the
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Korean car insurance market. With the provision of panel data sets, I ex­
plore the accident probability changes over time since the implementation 
of the regulation change holds individual characteristics unchanged. In this 
work, I aim at detecting moral hazard separately. This is the theme of the 
chapter 3.
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Tab. 2.11: Dynamic Model of Contract Choice and Accident Occurrence
Variables coverage claims
GEN 0.0451 (0.0633) 0.1248 (0.0245)
MS -0.0640 (0.0549) -0.0214 (0.0234)
CAGE1 -0.5319 (0.0784) -0.1133 (0.0360)
CAGE2 -0.1892 (0.0704) -0.0300 (0.0290)
CAGE3 -0.2128 (0.0650) 0.0091 (0.0268)
AGE1 -0.3352 (0.0905) 0.1797 (0.0469)
AGE2 -0.0191 (0.0641) -0.0044 (0.0266)
AGE4 -0.0818 (0.0798) 0.0334 (0.0287)
AGE5 -0.3247 (0.0961) -0.0759 (0.0433)
CONS -0.3752 (0.1240) -1.6872 (0.0768)
Predetermined
LAGCON 2.9795 (0.0975) 0.6118 (0.0854)
LAGCLA 0.1370 (0.0788) 0.1747 (0.0334)
BM -0.9640 (0.1134) 0.1681 (0.0708)
Initial Conditions
INICON 0.7864 (0.1033) -0.2347 (0.0806)
INICLA 0.0061 (0.0917) -0.0656 (0.0371)
INIBM 0.1402 (0.1146) -0.1089 (0.0653)
Correlation Coefficient
Rho 0.1238 (0.0460)
Unobserved Heterogeneity Distribution estim ate probability
(wd>wn) (0, 0) 0.2497
(-0.0005, 0) 0.2501
i ^ d ^ n ) (0, -0.0013) 0.2501
(-0.0005, -0.0013) 0.2501
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C h a p t e r  3
T e s t i n g  f o r  t h e  P r e s e n c e  o f  
M o r a l  H a z a r d  u s i n g  t h e  
R e g u l a t o r y  C h a n g e _____________
3.1 Introduction
It has been of some serious concern that there are a large number of car 
accidents in Korea compared with other developed countries. On average 
car accident rates1 are twice as high as accident rates in other developed 
countries. For instance, in 1996, the accident rate in Korea was 2.9% whereas 
it was 1.1% in the USA, 1.1% in Japan, and 0.9% in the UK. Car accident 
occurrence has had a substantial effect on the whole economy as well as 
on individual lives. Under these circumstances, in April 1999, the Financial 
Supervisory Service (FSS) announced that it would introduce a new incentive 
system beginning May 1999 in order to reduce the number of car accidents




According to previous research (particularly, Lee [1997]) in Korea, it ap­
pears that those who have violated traffic laws tend to have more accidents, 
approximately 25 % higher, than those who have not2. In this regard, the 
records of traffic law violations are a very useful informational indicator re­
flecting driving habits: And further to this, there have been some concern 
with regard to the efficiency of the market: That is, given that those who 
violate serious traffic laws tend to exhibit higher accident probability - as is 
shown in both theoretical and empirical work - there does then exist an issue 
concerning the unfair subsidy provided by those who keep to the law to those 
who violate the law: That is an unfair disparity since there is no difference in 
insurance premiums between them. Thus, in addition to the actual accident 
occurrence, the FSS has decided to link traffic law violations records with 
car insurance premiums in an attem pt to reduce the number of car accidents 
and enhance market efficiency.
In this chapter, I investigate the presence of the moral hazard phenomenon 
using the data generated by the regulatory change. W ith the implementation 
of new regulation the same people successively face different incentive struc­
tures that are exogenously given. Here, the selection process is no longer a 
problem. Any resulting change in behaviour can safely be attributed to the 
variation of incentives. Thus, the idea is that policyholders are expected to 
exert higher effort levels to avoid violations of the relevant traffic laws espe­
cially if there is hidden action on their side. Moreover, if those traffic laws
2Also, Korea Non-Life Insurance Association (KNIA) announced th a t this rate was 
30% in FY 2002.
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are significantly related to accident occurrence either directly or indirectly, 
the higher effort will cause lower accident probability in the end. Overall, 
using the new data provided by regulatory change I seek to focus on moral 
hazard only, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.
Using the data sets from the Korean car insurance companies, I test the 
hypothesis described above. This work aims to contribute to the ‘natural 
experiment’ literature within the field of empirical contract theory. In section 
[2], I briefly present the related literature. In Section [3] I explain the details 
of regulatory change. I test the above hypothesis in both parametric and 
nonparametric ways in section [4]. Then I conclude discussing these results 
in the last section.
3.2 Related Literatures
In empirical contract theory, there has been some research using natural 
experiments to distinguish adverse selection and moral hazard.
Dionne et al. [2001b] study the effects of new incentive systems on average 
accident frequency in the Canadian car insurance market. They evaluate 
the effects of the 1992 changes in car insurance pricing in Quebec by the 
SAAQ (the public monopoly insurer for bodily injuries)3 on road safety. 
Before this structural change, the demerit points accumulated were not used 
in a pricing scheme (‘memoryless’). Using a negative binomial model with 
random effects, they show that the new system provided strong incentives 
to increase prevention and, as a result, it reduced infractions and accidents
3Damage on property is covered by the private sector.
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implying increased road safety. They conclude that changes in policyholders’ 
behaviour, as triggered by the new incentives, did produce a significant effect 
011 accident probabilities.
Browne and Puelz [1999] study the economic consequences of tort reform: 
Firstly, they test the relationship between tort reforms and claim severity for 
automobile liability incidents: Further, they test the effect of tort reforms 
on economic and non-economic damage separately: Using OLS, they show 
that many of the reforms have had a statistically significant effects on total, 
non-economic and economic damage. Secondly, they test the proposition 
that tort reforms, by reducing the damage available at trial, have reduced 
the likelihood that an injured party will seek legal remedy: Using the logit 
model they confirm that the presence of the reform is associated with a 
reduction in the likelihood of a claim being filed. Both aspects of the study 
are examined using individual data sources from a large sample of claims 
from 61 insurers in 1992.
An ideal experiment would involve a reference sample tha t is not affected 
by the change, and a treatm ent sample that is; Chiappori et al. [1998] employs 
this methodology. Following a change in regulation in 1993, French health 
insurance companies modified the co-payment rate in a non-uniform way. 
Their data set contains two subgroups, one for which a co-payment rate of 
10% for physician visits was introduced and the other for which no change 
occurred during the period. They test if the number of visits per agent was 
modified by this co-payment rate. The data reject the hypothesis for office 
visits but does not for home visits. This suggests tha t there is moral hazard 
in demand for some physician services.
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My approach is similar to the research noted above. Since regulatory 
change in Korea now applies to every policyholder uniformly, I do not have 
reference and treatm ent samples separately. In this case, as mentioned in 
Chiappori and Salanie [2003], it may establish a simultaneity rather than 
a causality. That is, when accident rates significantly change over a given 
period, and this evolution immediately follows a regulatory reform, the two 
phenomena might result from simultaneous and independent causes. For 
instance, the lower accident rates may be due to milder climate conditions. 
However, I think that external environments such as road condition do not 
change in a very fast way and, and as a result, I may still test for causality 
although it is hard to discard such a coincidences entirely.
3.3 Incentive System Change in Korean Car Insurance Market
The new regulation took effect with contracts starting in September 2000. 
Thus, it was traffic law violations records beginning from May 1999 to the end 
of April 2000 that were incorporated in the contracts starting from September
2000. Then, the previous 2 years records were reflected in the contracts since
2001. The reference to which this regulatory change is applied is the actual 
policyholders. The sequence is summarised as follows:
• 1999. 4: the introduction of new policy announced
• 1999. 5 - 2000. 4: traffic law violation recorded
• 2000. 9 - 2001. 8: previous year’s records reflected
• 2000. 5 - 2001. 4: traffic law violation recorded
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• 2001. 9 - 2001. 8: previous 2 years’ records reflected
Not all traffic law violations are reflected in the insurance premium. It 
has been revealed that 6 serious violations are most directly related to car 
accidents happening4. It is those violations that are reflected in the records. 
Table 2.3 is reproduced below.
cohort relevant items
penalty group hit and run, drunk driving and driving without a 
licence (more than once): 10% 
trespass of center line, over-speed and traffic signal 
violation (more than twice): 5%
bonus group no violations
trivial violations that are not recorded
When there is are traffic law violations, the possible increase in insur­
ance premiums is 5% - 15%. However when there is no violation within the 
contract year, an insurer is allowed to discount the premium within, 10%5.
As mentioned above, and although there has been some basic research 
discovering the correlation between traffic law violations and car accident 
occurrence, there has been no research at the micro level regarding the im­
pact of new regulation on the number of car accidents. Now, ‘running’ with 
the assumption that traffic law violations are related to the occurrence of
4It has been reported tha t, in 1995, the number of serious violations are 2.18 million
out of to tal violations numbering 8.54 million: tha t is almost 25.5%.
5During the implementation stage, all the insurance companies set up 0.3% for a bonus.
Thus, they have been criticised for being collusive.
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accidents, I compare the outcomes from B/A [Before & After] design using 
the introduction of new regulation to see if individual behaviour in relation 
to accident probability alters, if anything. Given the exogenous feature of the 
above regulation change, we may have a ‘natural experiment’ opportunity. 
Therefore, I should here focus on the moral hazard phenomenon only.
3.4 Estimations
3.4.1 Param etric E stim ation
M ethodology
First of all, I estimate the average accident probability using the logit model 
(Cramer [1991]). In the logit model, the probability of having an accident is 
given by
t-w . e x p (a +  2 ;'/?)
Pl  =  E ( y t =  1 |Xi ) =
1 +  exp(o +  x'i/3) 
Accordingly, we have
1 - P i  = l -  E (yi =  1| =
1 +  exp(o +  x'i/3) ' 
Then, we can calculate the odd-ratio
Pi
1 -  Pi
Finally, we derive the log-odds
=  exp(o +  x'ip).
E  - ln(—^  ) =  a  +  x'ifi.
Pi
The interpretation of a  is the value of log-odds towards having an accident 
if regressors are zero. This term reflects the difference in levels across time
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periods in the accident probabilities. My identification of moral hazard is on 
the change in a  over time. If a  is decreasing after the introduction of the 
new incentive scheme, I would say that there is a moral hazard problem.
D ata
Mainly, I concentrate on data [A] since it includes the contract periods both 
before and after the implementation of the new regulation. Thus, this data 
set is ideal for a B /A  analysis. However, I also use the data [B] to generate 
a supplementary outcome. As mentioned in the data section, data [A] is 
only for young divers aged 18-30 years old at the very first contract year 
1998. Since I focus on accident rate changes in subgroups constructed by 
established individual characteristics, I use regressors such as gear type, ABS 
equipment, car size and car production year in the parametric estimation. 
All of them are dummy variables. For data [B], I have a dummy regressor, 
and car production year for each policyholder in the parametric estimation.
R esults
The very first samples that I use in data [A] are the observations from data 
for those individuals who ‘contracted’ for 2 years between May 1998 and 
April 1999 and, subsequently, between May 1999 and April 2000. This time 
period encompasses the periods both before and after the introduction of the 
new policy: There are 7,300 policyholders in this category.
The table 3.1 shows the change in the constant term in the logit esti­
mation for each of the subgroups before and after the implementation. The 
subgroups are constructed by gender and residential location (table B .l in
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appendix B). From table 3.1, we can see that there is no impact from the new 
regulation upon the level of the accident probability. Even so, the constant 
increased after the introduction of this regulation, apart from MK and FK.
______________________ Tab. 3.1: May Results 1_______________________
Logit 1998 1999
MS -2.575006 (0.352) -2.468639 (0.340)
MK -2.496618 (0.315) -2.852130 (0.312)
MKI -2.101030 (0.279) -2.075481 (0.268)
MCJ -2.618433 (0.325) -2.372962 (0.286)
FS -2.783250 (0.699) -2.246137 (0.729)
FK -2.135783 (0.664) -3.682417 (1.085)
FKI -1.588030 (0.514) -1.267515 (0.458)
FCJ -3.470858 (1.162) -1.300422* (0.722)
(standard errors in parenthesis) 
* insignificant at 95 % level
To identify further the effects over a given time period, I also perform the 
same procedure for those who contracted for 3 years: That is between May 
1998 and April 1999, between May 1999 and April 2000, and between May 
2000 and April 2001: There are 4,560 policyholders included in this group.
Again, we can observe that the constant terms slightly increase year by 
year, after implementation for most subgroups as seen in table 3.2.
Now, I investigate the effect on those who contracted for [4] years. There 
are 2,568 policyholders in this category. Over time, the constant terms more 
or less increased again. Here, in table 3.3, I report for only male subgroups
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Tab. 3.2: May Results 2
Logit 1998 1999 2000
MS -2.829122 (0.469) -2.275663 (0.410) -2.506132 (0.396)
MK -2.482830 (0.412) -3.013533 (0.436) -3.629039 (0.535)
MKI -2.389946 (0.380) -2.271980 (0.385) -2.016814 (0.339)
MCJ -2.799210 (0.415) -2.637945 (0.401) -2.163179 (0.339)
FS -3.451613 (1.028) -2.743998 (1.263) -0.958689* (0.803)
FK -2.408277 (0.460) -2.57477 (0.484) -2.638594 (0.553)
FKI -1.501551 (0.677) -0.943520* (0.620) -3.589317 (0.963)
FCJ -3.314352 (1.304) -1.723058* (0.919) -2.012149 (0.886)
* insignificant at 95 % level
because the number of female samples are too small to have reasonable esti­
mates in the parametric estimation. I complement this with nonparametric 
results
Finally, I implement the estimation using those who contracted for [3] 
years. These observations began contracts beginning from May 1999 on-
_______________________Tab. 3.3: May Results_3_______________________________
Logit 1998 1999 2000 2001
MS -2.143663 (0.615) -3.319481 (0.841) -2.263120 (0.581) -1.833864 (0.510)
MK -2.663637 (0.623) -3.592095 (0.714) -3.446649 (0.806) -1.857960 (0.466)
MKI -2.969292 (0.769) -2.089851 (0.550) -1.493743 (0.409) -1.557476 (0.414)
MCJ -2.140236 (0.529) -3.439654 (0.757) -2.373685 (0.499) -1.697384 (0.475)
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Tab. 3.4: Overall Results A
Logit 1999 2000 2001
MS -2.521661 (0.282) -2.139879 (0.247) -1.862629 (0.223)
MK -2.489937 (0.252) -2.306955 (0.242) -2.180988 (0.215)
MKI -2.057032 (0.247) -1.907823 (0.216) -1.585742 (0.187)
MCJ -2.673128 (0.281) -2.604255 (0.273) -2.037970 (0.222)
FS -2.763816 (0.570) -2.344158 (0.528) -1.392573 (0.463)
FK -2.495490 (0.621) -3.876313 (0.790) -2.091269 (0.485)
FKI -2.024095 (0.456) -1.734645 (0.454) -1.545056 (0.434)
FCJ -1.803356 (0.524) -2.252885 (0.560) -1.285957 (0.407)
wards. These contracts are all affected by the introduction of the new policy: 
there are 10,580 policyholders in all. In this estimation, I use the samples 
contracted in May and June for each year to have complete spells for 3 years 
(please note that the last contract year in the data is truncated at the end 
of June).
In this outcome, not a single subgroup seems to be affected by the new 
regulation. Overall we do not see any significant change in the constant term 
from the logit estimations.
Additionally, I present the outcome for data [B] in table B.3 in appendix 
B. I have 34,328 observations initially contracted between May and Septem­
ber [1999]. Here, I have similar patterns to outcomes from data [A] apart 
from MMS, FMS and MuMS for which the constant terms decreased. How­
ever, overall, we again observe that there is no such change in constant term 
for logit estimation.
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3.4.2 N onparam etric E stim ation  
M ethodology
In this section, I implement the simple nonparametric analysis (Ichimura 
[2005]) using the same data set as used in the previous section.
For i =  1, ...,n  and a random variable Y{ and a /F-dimensional random 
vector Xi, and m{x) = E{Yi\Xi — x),
Yi = m(Xi) + €i 
E(6i\Xi) = 0 
E { t \ \X t) < C < oo.
I consider estimation of a function m(-) : R K —> R.
Let x be a point we wish to evaluate function ra(-) at. In this case, what 
I want to estimate is m(x),  and that is just one number I want to estimate. 
Assume for a moment that Xi  has repeated observations at x. Then,
Elti 
EIL, i{*, = *}
would be a natural estimator of m(x). In fact, if each element of K-vector 
is a discrete random variable, then I can estimate ra(-) by the method just 
described. I just calculate cell means for each x.
I calculate average probability of accident for each subgroup described in 
the appendix and compare the accident probabilities over time.
R esults
Through table 3.5 and table 3.8, I present the cell means for each subgroup 
over time. The outcomes display very similar patterns to the outcomes of
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the parametric estimation. That is, there is no such change in accident 
probability over time before and after the introduction of the new regulation.
There are some subgroups that exhibit possible effects: These are similar 
to the outcomes from the parametric estimation, in table 3.5, the average 
probability of accident decreased for FS and FK. However, in the subsequent 
tables, I cannot discover any substantial decrease in accident probability.
Again, the outcomes for data set [B] are presented in table B.4 in appendix 
B. For this particular sample, there is no effect at all.
Tab. 3.5: May Results 1 A
N o n p a r a m e tr ic 1998 1999
M S 0 .0 7 5 8 5 0 .0 8 1 4 9
M K 0 .0 4 7 7 8 0 .0 6 2 2 5
M K I 0 .0 8 3 2 8 0 .0 8 8 1 4
M C J 0 .0 6 5 5 9 0 .0 7 6 0 5
F S 0 .0 9 8 1 0 0 .0 6 9 4 0
F K 0 .0 6 9 0 5 0 .0 5 7 5 5
F K I 0 .1 0 1 0 9 0 .1 3 3 8 8
F C J 0 .0 6 6 2 0 0 .0 8 9 9 7
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Tab. 3.6: May Results2 A
N o n p a r a m e tr ic 1998 1999 2 0 0 0
M S 0 .0 7 2 2 7 0 .0 7 5 3 7 0 .0 8 6 8 4
M K 0 .0 4 3 5 2 0 .0 5 5 3 5 0 .0 4 7 5 8
M K I 0 .0 8 2 9 7 0 .0 8 0 3 8 0 .0 9 1 2 9
M C J 0 .0 6 2 7 9 0 .0 7 1 6 8 0 .0 8 1 0 8
F S 0 .0 8 7 8 0 0 .0 6 2 2 0 0 .0 8 1 3 4
F K 0 .0 6 4 9 8 0 .0 6 5 9 3 0 .0 3 6 3 6
F K I 0 .1 1 3 5 4 0 .1 3 6 5 6 0 .0 6 0 8 7
F C J 0 .0 4 9 7 2 0 .0 8 7 4 3 0 .0 8 4 2 7
Tab. 3.7: May Results3 A
N o n p a r a m e tr ic 1998 1999 2 0 0 0 2001
M S 0.0 6 6 5 1 0 .0 5 8 5 4 0 .0 8 9 8 3 0 .1 0 0 9 6
M K 0 .0 2 6 7 3 0 .0 4 5 8 1 0 .0 4 1 0 7 0 .0 7 6 4 3
M K I 0 .0 4 7 2 4 0 .0 6 4 6 4 0 .1 0 4 2 5 0 .1 0 7 9 5
M C J 0 .0 4 7 7 1 0 .0 4 0 0 8 0 .0 8 0 9 7 0 .0 8 2 6 6
F S 0 .0 5 7 3 8 0 .0 4 2 3 7 0 .0 8 4 0 3 0 .1 2 0 6 9
F K 0 .0 5 4 7 9 0 .0 7 8 5 7 0 .0 2 9 2 0 0 .0 7 9 1 4
F K I 0 .0 6 3 4 9 0 .1 3 6 3 6 0 .0 6 0 1 5 0 .1 0 5 6 3
F C J 0 .0 0 9 4 3 0 .0 7 2 7 3 0 .0 8 4 1 1 0 .0 5 8 2 5
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Tab. 3.8: Overall Results A
N o n p a r a m e tr ic 1999 2 00 0 2 001
M S 0 .0 8 5 1 9 0 .0 9 8 0 2 0 .1 1 9 2 7
M K 0 .0 6 4 7 4 0 .0 6 9 5 4 0 .0 9 5 1 2
M K I 0 .09 35 1 0 .0 9 9 5 1 0 .1 3 4 1 6
M C J 0 .0 6 4 9 7 0 .0 7 0 6 7 0 .0 9 5 9 8
F S 0 .0 9 2 1 6 0 .1 0 3 3 8 0 .1 2 4 4 9
F K 0.07 06 1 0 .0 6 7 5 5 0 .0 9 5 1 6
F K I 0 .1 3 4 1 9 0 .1 1 1 3 1 0 .1 1 3 2 1
F C J 0 .0 8 0 5 4 0 .0 7 9 0 1 0 .1 0 5 0 2
3.5 Discussions
As can be seen from the results in the previous section, I conclude that 
there has been no significant effect concerning the introduction of new regu­
lation on accident probabilities apart from a few subgroups (mainly women 
in some regions). Further, for some additional robustness, I also implement 
both parametric and nonparametric estimations for young drivers (defined by 
contract experience coefficient). From my point of view, it may be the case 
that old drivers (those who have driven a car for a long time) find it difficult 
to change their driving behaviour in response to the incentive system change. 
However, the results here display similar patterns to my previous results. As 
a result, we could say that there is not any phenomenon such as moral hazard 
in the car insurance market. Then, as many people have sought to critically 
point out, the net effect of the new regulation may have only been to in­
crease insurance companies revenues without significantly reducing accident
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probability.
However, there should be some caution in putting forward this conclusion. 
In particular, in order to question this, I may need to propose a question 
such as:- whether the premium increase, due to traffic law violations, has 
been high enough to induce the drivers to change their habits. As the FSS 
have repeatedly announced the amount of premium increase due to traffic 
law violations in the new regulation may not have been effective at all. This 
may be shown by the following table which shows the penalty system of other 
countries where a similar system has been developed.
Tab. 3.9: Penalty System in Other Countries
U.S U.K. Canada











penalty rate 40-220% 25-50% 25-250%
application period 3 years 5 years
As we can observe from this table, penalty rates are much higher than the 
rates in Korean system. Further, there is no bonus rate for those who keep to 
the traffic laws. Thus, given that the current penalty rates are not sufficiently 
punitive to induce change in driver behaviour, the FSS introduced a stronger 
incentive system in 2005. This has strengthened the current system in several 
ways:
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First of all, and markedly different from the last system, it widens the 
relevant penalty group. In addition to [6] serious violations, a few more 
violations such as: protection of pedestrians, and overtaking laws have been 
included.
Secondly, in the modified regulation, the number of violations m atter. 
Thus, it is 10% if there is one violation of the relevant law, this increases to 
20% for 2 violations with a maximum possible penalty rate of 30%.
Finally, the application period is made longer, up to [3] years rather than 
the current [2] years.
My final judgement on the presence of moral hazard may be subject 
to future research: productively focussing on the effects of a modified and 
much stronger incentive system with regards to accident probability. If future 
research shows no evidence of hidden action, - from a policyholder perspective 
- then there should be a dramatic change in policy within the car insurance 
market.
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C h a p t e r  4
T e s t s  f o r  M o r a l  H a z a r d  a n d  
A d v e r s e  S e l e c t i o n  in  t h e  C a r  
I n s u r a n c e  M a r k e t _______________
4-1 Introduction
Recent literature on empirical contract theory has been rapidly growing. 
Particularly, most empirical work has been facilitated by an intense use of 
insurance data sets. Here the primary concern has been to detect the pres­
ence of such phenomenon as moral hazard and adverse selection or both. In 
this chapter I attem pt to contribute to the direction of this research using 
the Korean car insurance data set. Much research so far has investigated the 
relationship between contract choice and ex-post accident occurrence (‘con­
ditional correlation approach’) in the car insurance market, most notably, 
Chiappori and Salanie [2000]. Here, in this chapter, I am taking a slightly 
different approach yet exploring the same problem.
Firstly, addressing the ‘moral hazard phenomenon’, with the aid of an
81
enriched data set I perform a simple test where I analyse the relationship 
between a particular policyholder contract choice and their car value. In 
the Korean car insurance market policyholders can freely choose insurance 
coverage among six coverage types1. Here I focus on the choice of insur­
ance coverage that specifically covers damage on the policyholder’s own car. 
Chiefly, I investigate whether the choice of this particular coverage ‘mono- 
tonically’ increases in the car value. My intuition is tha t if policyholders 
cannot adjust their behaviour it would be rational for them to buy coverage 
for car damage when the car value is high. For this purpose, I use those who 
purchased all 6 coverage types and those who purchased all but the cover­
age that covers damage on the policyholder’s own car. Then, I want to see 
whether the number of people in the first group is substantially higher as the 
car values increase.
A natural consequence of this, I estimate the distribution of car values, 
and I compute the proportion of the 2 policyholder groups in each quantile 
of the distribution. However, I need to solve a missing data problem in 
the estimation. Since the insurance company does not record car values 
for those who do not purchase car damage coverage, I face missing data 
problem as described in Manski [1994], Manski [1995] and Manski [2003]. To 
solve this problem, I use the bounds approach on the car value distribution. 
Using the bounds approach, I estimate the car distribution and compute the 
corresponding qunatiles in a nonparametric way.
Next, I implement a simple test to detect the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity in risk levels across policyholders using conditional variance
lrThis is explained in detail in section 2.2, chapter 2.
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identity. The idea is that, under no unobserved heterogeneity, the variance 
of accident occurrence is not attributed to the differences in accident prob­
ability across policyholders. Since adverse selection happens when there is 
a difference in policyholder risk levels, this process is a reasonable substi­
tute for testing for the presence of adverse selection. Using repeated cross 
sectional samples, I compute the overall variance of accident occurrence prob­
ability over the entire sample and investigate how much the differences across 
policyholders contribute to the volatility of accident occurrence.
In what follows, I present the two works described above. Then working 
through each section in turn I describe the characteristics of the data used, 
the estimation methods, and the results.
4-2 Moral Hazard
4.2.1 T heoretical Basis
Here I follow a standard insurance economics model (for instance, see Mossin 
[1968] and Borch [1990]). Consider a policyholder owning and driving a car 
the value of which is V . In addition, he owns wealth with a total amount 
of y. It is assumed that during any specified time interval the car value will 
either be lost with probability p or suffer no damage at all with probability 
1 — p and the policyholder has the possibility of insuring his own car. The 
premium he would have to pay is denoted by q. The policyholder is assumed 
to be risk averse (u'(-) > 0 and u"(-) < 0).
The policyholder can freely choose the amount of insurance coverage.
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Here, I define the contract that covers owner car damage as comprehensive. 
Otherwise, it is a non-comprehensive contract. Therefore, if s/he purchases 
comprehensive insurance, it would cover the damage to his/her own car when 
there is accident occurrence.
When a policyholder purchases non-comprehensive insurance, the ex­
pected utility is given by
EU"C =  u ( Vi -  V, -  + u(Vi -  0 ( 1  -  P f ) .
where nc denotes a non-comprehensive insurance. The probability is super­
scripted by nc, which shows the induced probability by the given insurance 
coverage under the presence of moral hazard.
However, if he instead decides to buy comprehensive coverage, it becomes2
E U C =  u ( y z - d i -  q - ) p c{ +  u ( Vi -  q^){  1 -  p \ ) .
When a policyholder buys a comprehensive policy, s/he can also choose the 
level of deductibles. Then, the reimbursement given to a policyholder, when 
there is an accident, becomes3:
10 if L < dL — d if L > d
In the static framework, the condition for a policyholder’s choosing non- 
comprehensive insurance contract is
u ( y i  - d i -  q - ) p • +  u { y i  -  q-)( 1 - p - )  <  u ( y t - V i ~  q ^ p T  +  u ( y i  -  q?c) {  1  ~ p T ) -
2We could alternatively express gf =  q ™ c  +  q i , where q i  is an additional premium for
coverage on owner car damage. Notice tha t q i  is a function of car value. However, this
component is not linear in a car value.
3This system is called straight deductible (Lee et al. [1999]).
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I state that there is no moral hazard if pc{ — p™c4. That is, there is no induced 
difference in the accident probability in both cases. Under this condition, if 
there is no moral hazard, I can derive the following conditions
1. Vi +  q.ic <  di +  q c{
2. qnc <  q\ .
The second condition here is trivially satisfied and so I focus on the first 
condition, which functions as a base for the empirical work.
TESTABLE PREDICTIO N: If there is no moral hazard and car value 
is quite low being close to the deductible amount given that there is a differ­
ence in premiums between [2] different types of contract, it is rational for a 
policyholder to purchase a non-comprehensive contract. The testable impli­
cation is that the number of people who purchase cover for own car damage 
is quite small in the bottom quantiles of car value distribution and substan­
tially higher in the upper quantiles.
In reality, this argument makes sense because if the car value is not so 
high it would be better to abandon the car rather than fixing and using 
it again. Under this circumstance, it is not rational to pay an additional 
premium to buy comprehensive coverage. However, it is worth buying the 
comprehensive for those who have high value cars in the presence of no moral 
hazard.
4In this case, when we assume the additive separable effort cost function, they are 
canceled out on both sides.
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4.2.2 D ata  D escription
In this analysis, as mentioned above, I define comprehensive coverage as 
purchasing all the coverage types and the non-comprehensive coverage as 
buying all but coverage [4].
W ith these coverage types, for my analysis, I use one (data A) of 2 data 
sets that I have obtained since the other data set (data B) does not contain 
information on the car values5. In my work, I use the contracts that were 
written between 01/01/1998 and 31/12/1998 (contract year 1998) from com­
pany [A]. In this sample, the contract choices are given by table 4.16. The 
numerical value corresponds to the coverage type given in the table 2.1 in 
chapter 2. For instance, 123456 means that the policyholder purchased all 6 
coverage.
In this sample, I use 123056 and 123456. The only difference between 
them is a purchase of coverage [4] that covers damage or theft on a policy­
holder’s own car. As can be seen, these policyholders consist of nearly 80% 
of the total sample.
Next, I present the deductible choices among 123456 policyholders. De­
ductible choices available to policyholders are shown in the table 4.27.
5So far, only the Israeli data  in Cohen [2005] contains inform ation of car values. How­
ever, this data  has only comprehensive contracts.
6As supplementary information, I also present the contract choices in d a ta  from com­
pany [B] in appendix C. We can see th a t this data  set also displays a similar pattern  as 
da ta  [A], The only difference is tha t, in data [B], the number of people who purchased
compulsory coverage only is quite substantial.
7KW means Korean Won, which is the Korean currency unit. G BP is calculated using
yearly average exchange rate in 1998.
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Tab. 4.1: Tabulation of Coverage Choices
cover Freq Percent Cum
100000 10 0.00 0.00
103000 1 0.00 0.01
103050 1 0.00 0.01
120000 15 0.01 0.01
123000 14,582 7.19 7.20
123050 26,518 13.07 20.27
123056 73,884 36.41 56.67
123400 310 0.15 56.82
123450 294 0.14 56.97
123456 87,325 43.03 100.00
Total 202,940 100.00
Tab. 4.2: Tabulation of Deductible Choices
Deductible Freq Percent Cum
0 8 0.01 0.01
KW 50,000 (22 GBP) 82,453 94.42 94.43
KW 100,000 (44 GBP) 2,733 3.13 97.56
KW 200,000 (88 GBP) 407 0.47 98.03
KW 300,000 (132 GBP) 1,109 1.27 99.30
KW 500,000 (220 GBP) 615 0.70 100.00
Total 87,325 100.00
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As shown, there are 5 types of deductible choice. It is shown that majority 
of the policyholders chose the lowest amount of deductible8. Due to this 
phenomenon, I perform my analysis based on the lowest deductible choice.
4.2.3 N onparam etric A nalysis using B ounds
Mainly, I want to see changes in the ratio between 123056 and 123456 as 
car values increase. However, with obvious reason9, the insurance company 
does not record information on car values for 123056 group. Therefore, the 
missing data problem naturally arises. As a result, I use ‘bounds’ on the car 
value distribution. Particularly, I compute bounds on the quantiles of the car 
value distribution for each cell. I make the small cells according to various 
individual characteristics and a car characteristic. Then, in the distribution, 
if the number of policyholders who purchased coverage for their own car 
damage is increasing, I may conclude that there is no moral hazard. My 
analysis is based on some previous research such as Manski [1994], Manski 
[1995] and Blundell et al. [2006]10.
In this section, I analyse car value dispersion allowing for the sample 
selection induced by individuals’ non-purchase of coverage for own car dam­
age. Further, I use bounds to the car value distribution and its quantiles to 
address the issue of selection without relying on strong assumptions.
First, I denote some variables as follows:
8In this respect, there has been a concern in the Korean insurance industry th a t the
deductible does not work as it is supposed to.
9In case of an accident, the company does not have to cover the damage to the car.
10Also, Lee [2005] discusses the same problem in the program  evaluation context.
• V : the dependent random variable
• X:  the conditioning vector
• C indicates whether the individual purchases coverage for own car dam­
age
• P{C — 1|.t): the probability of C =  1 given X  — x
•  F(v\ x): the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of V  given X  — x
• F (v \x : C — 1): the CDF of V  given X  — x and C — 1
• F(v\x, C  =  0): the CDF of V  given X  — x  and C — 0.
F{v\x) is the object of our interest. However, it is not identified because 
of non-random sample selection. The sampling process does identify the 
selection probability P(C — l|a:), the censoring probability [1 — P(C  = l|x)], 
and the measure of v conditional on selection, F(v\x,  C — 1) below.
F{v\x) =  F(v \x ,C  — 1 )P{C — l|x) +  F(v \x ,C  = 0)[1 — P{C — l|x)].
This is uninformative regarding the measure of v conditional on censoring, 
which is F(v \x ,C  = 0). To overcome this problem, I use the worst case 
bounds, which is the most conservative one given tha t no other prior infor­
mation on the distribution is available.
W orst case bounds
If I use the following inequality
0 < F(v \x ,C  =  0) <  1,
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then, the bounds to the cumulative distribution function become:
F(v\x, C =  1 )P(C — l|x) < F(v\x) < F(v\x, C — 1 )P(C — l \x )+[ l—P{C — 1|^)]-
The bounds then can be translated to give the worst case bounds on the 
conditional quantiles. Denoting by vq(x) the qth quantile of F(v\x),  we have
Vq(l\ x )  < Vq(x) < Vq(U\ x ) :
where vq^ ( x )  is the lower bound and vq(u\ x )  is the upper bound that solve 
the equations
q(u) =  F(v\x, C — 1 )P(C — 1 | r c )  and q(l) — F(v\x, C — 1 )P(C — l\x) + [l — P(C  =  1
with respect to v, respectively. As known, unless there are restrictions on 
the support of V, we can only identify q(l) > 1 — P(C = l|x ) and q(u) <
P(C — l|x). Thus, when P(C = l|x) is higher, the bounds on quantiles 
become tighter.
Estim ation
I estimate the bounds to the distribution of car values to compute the bounds 
to the quantiles using non-parametric methods proposed by Blundell et al.
[2006],
The dependent variable is the car value. The conditioning vector includes 
policyholder’s gender, policyholder’s place of residence, car size (measured 
by CC) and car age, and gear type.
I construct the cells as follows. Regarding individual characteristics, I 
have [2] gender groups and [2] residential groups. For tractability, I divide
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the place of residence into the capital city areas and other areas. For a car 
characteristic, I have [4] car size groups and [3] car age groups. Additionally,
I include [2] gear type groups. This is summarized in the table C.2 in the 
appendix C. Overall, I construct 96 cells.
Then, the probability of purchasing coverage [4] with characteristics x k 
is estimated by
p ,  , _  E . ' I i H C i  =  i K t e )
V "  kJ t )2^=i
where I  {A) is the indicator function which equals one whenever A  holds and 
the weights are defined by
ftk{x i) — I{genderi — genderk)I(residencei =  residencek)I(carsizei  =  carcizek) 
I(carcigei — caragek)I(geartypei — geartypek) .
This is just the calculation of cell means for each x k.
To estimate empirical distribution of car values, I allow for smoothing.
Thus, the estimator is given by
i{Ci =
where $  is a standardized normal CDF and a bandwidth, /i, is set at a fifth 
of the standard deviation of car values.
4.2 .4  R esu lts
As described in the previous section, I have total 96 cells. Among them, 33 
cells have a very low probability of purchasing the coverage [4]. Therefore,
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for those cells, quantiles are poorly identified. However, in the remaining 63 
cells, I have fairly tight bounds. In this section, I present results for some cells 
because all the results display similar patterns. First, I present the result for 
those who are male and live in the capital city areas. The car characteristics 
for them are that the cars were made before 1995, the car size is equal to 
or greater than 1500CC and less than 2000CC, and the gear type is auto or 
semi-auto. This is presented in table 4.3.











KW 1,021,518 (£441) 
KW 1,650,849 (£712) 
KW 2,227,076 (£961) 
KW 2,791,250 (£1,205) 
KW 3,350,433 (£1,446) 
KW 3,912,942 (£1,689) 
KW 4,699,657 (£2,028)
KW 1,490,169 (£643) 
KW 2,069,050 (£893) 
KW 2,637,653 (£1,138) 
KW 3,198,204 (£1,380) 
KW 3,752,002 (£1,619) 
KW 4,426,413 (£1,910) 
KW 6,584,968 (£2,842)
Given this result, I first compute the number of policyholders who pur­
chased 123456 coverage in each 10% in the estimated distribution using upper 
bounds. In this cell, it is given by 140, 151, 148, 142, 143, 158 and 141. Next, 
I also compute the same numbers using lower bounds. It is 145, 149, 152, 
130, 176, 147 and 125. This is summarized in table 4.4. Notice that, in 
my testable prediction under no moral hazard, it must be seen that there 
are small number of policyholders who purchase the additional coverage [4] 
with low valued cars whereas there are large number of policyholders with
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Tab. 4.4: Frequency of Purchasing Coverage 4
Values (£) Lower Values (£) Upper
441 -  712 145 -  643 140
712 -  961 149 643 -  893 151
961 -  1,205 152 893 -  1,138 148
1,205 -  1,446 130 1,138 -  1,380 142
1,446 -  1,689 176 1,380 -  1,619 143
1,689 -  2,028 147 1,619 -  1,910 158
2,028 - 125 1,910 -  2,842 141
high valued cars in the upper quantiles. However, the number of people who 
bought this coverage is more or less uniform. Thus, we tend to reject the 
null hypothesis that there is no moral hazard.
I present some more results to see the similar changes for different car 
value levels. In what follows, the first one is for those who are male and live 
in the capital city areas. The car characteristics for this cell is tha t the cars 
were made before 1995, the car size is between 1000CC and 1500CC, and the 
gear type is manual. The second one is for those who are male and live in 
the capital city areas. The car characteristics are tha t the cars were made 
between 1995 and 1996, the car size is between 1500CC and 2000CC and the 
gear type is auto or semi-auto. Qualitatively, the results for these cells also 
show the similar results as the first cell.
I present some more results for female policyholders in appendix C.
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Tab. 4.5: Upper and Lower Bounds for Quantiles
Quantile Lower Upper
10th quantile KW  822,662 (£355)
20th quantile KW 1,160,997 (£501)
30th quantile KW 1,452,985 (£627)
40th quantile KW 748,057 (£323) KW 1,726,433 (£745)
50th quantile KW 1,096,111 (£473) KW 1,995,247 (£861)
60th quantile KW 1,395,051 (£602) KW 2,326,629 (£1,004)
70th quantile KW 1,673,134 (£722)
80th quantile KW 1,939,630 (£837)
90th quantile KW 2,245,522 (£969)
Tab. 4.6: Frequency of Purchasing Coverage 4
Values (£) Lower Values (£) Upper
323 -  473 1355 0 -  355 1347
473 -  602 1403 355 -  501 1421
602 -  722 1431 501 -  627 1348
722 -  837 1282 627 -  745 1328
837 -  969 1513 745 -  861 1480
969 -  1316 861 -  1004 1561
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KW 3,471,162 (£1,498) 
KW 4,665,008 (£2,013) 
KW 5,242,453 (£2,262) 
KW 5,723,551 (£2,470) 
KW 6,229,459 (£2,688) 
KW 6,786,867 (£2,929) 
KW 7,466,224 (£3,222) 
KW 8,455,266 (£3,649)
KW 4,651,964 (£2,007) 
KW 5,231,978 (£2,258) 
KW 5,714,401 (£2,466) 
KW 6,218,256 (£2,683) 
KW 6,775,339 (£2,924) 
KW 7,449,817 (£3,215) 
KW 8,429,938 (£3,638) 
KW 13,189,083 (£5,691)
Tab. 4.8: Frequency of Purchasing Coverage 4
Values (£) Lower Values (£) Upper
1,498 -  2,013 194 -  2,007 198
2,013 -  2,262 211 2,007 -  2,258 202
2,262 -  2,470 232 2,258 -  2,466 215
2,470 -  2,688 160 2,466 -  2,683 176
2,688 -  2,929 232 2,683 -  2,924 234
2,929 -  3,222 210 2,924 -  3,215 216
3,222 -  3,649 230 3,215 -  3,638 229
3,649 - 192 3,638 -  5,691 190
95
4.2.5 D iscussions
Naturally, it could be asked why those who with low valued cars purchase 
the coverage 4 if there was no hidden action on the policyholders’ side. Are 
they really wiling to fix a car and drive it again when there is an accident? 
Further, it increases the next year’s premium by 10% when they use own car 
damage coverage. It may be very unlikely. However, there is a case where 
this sort of policyholders may have a gain. That is, total loss. This is defined 
as cash reimbursement because the accident is not repairable or fixing cost 
is greater than the car value. In my data, it is clearly shown as in table 4.9 
that this indeed happens11.
Tab. t:.9: Proportion of Total Loss
Values (£) Total Loss/Total Number of Accident
0 -  355 0.41
355 -  501 0.24
501 -  627 0.25
627 -  745 0.17
745 -  861 0.12
861 -  1,004 0.05
In this respect, I could say that there may be moral hazard phenomenon 
at least in the bottom quantiles12.
11 There may be an argument that low car value is more likely to be declared a total 
loss without any effects on policyholder’s behaviour. But, for a policyholder with a low 
car value, purchasing coverage for own car damage would cause a change in his behaviour
since he knows tha t any accident occurrence will benefit him.
12Recently, I have found out the following sort of news articles quite frequently: “It has
been reported th a t the car insurance companies are reluctant to insure own car damage
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Overall, and with regards to the future research, I need to take explicit 
account of contract choice and effort choice in the dynamic context to have a 
more comprehensive picture (for instance, interaction between effort cost and 
accident severity or/and future premium increase and one shot gain from cash 
reimbursement). The latter component would determine not only accident 
occurrence but also the severity of an accident. For this purpose, the fully 
structural estimation based on dynamic programming seems promising13.
4-3 Adverse Selection
4.3.1 Test Statistic
In this section, I investigate whether there is such a difference in policy­
holders’ risk level. For this purpose, I use the following conditional variance 
identity theorem (Casella and Berger [2002]):
Var (Dit) =  E[Var(At|0] +  Var[E(AtK)]>
where Dit is a binary random variable which takes [1] if there is an accident 
and [0] otherwise.
Given this, I state that adverse selection is very unlikely if pi = p. That 
is, the accident probability is not different across policyholders. This is trans­
lated as Var[E(D^|i)] =  0 in the theorem above.
To investigate this, I compute the following formula corresponding to the
for those whose car value is quite low.” -  Seoul Economic Daily (6 Feb 2006).
13The above listed developments are part of my future research.
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right hand side and the first term on the left hand side of the identity
where n is a number of policyholders, T  is a time period, D.. is an average 
accident occurrence across time and individual is an average accident 
occurrence across time.
If this is close to zero, this implies that there may not be such a difference 
in the risk levels.
4.3.2 D ata  and R esults
In the same data set A, I select the policyholders who repeatedly purchased 
insurance contracts over [4] contract years. I have 14,495 policyholders in 
this category.
Using this sample, I calculate the following magnitudes.
The difference between them is 0.00029962. This amount is very close to 
zero. Also, the variance of accident occurrence is explained 99.55% by the 
first argument of the identity.
As a complementary work, I implement the same procedure using more 
data. In the same data set [A], I select those who bought insurance contracts 
repeatedly over 3 years (1999-2001). I have 32,491 policyholders in this 
group. The result using this sample displays a similar result
-  D - f  =  0.066748671
and
1 1
E[Var(D,(|i)] =  -  -  D i ^  = 0.066449051
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Var(Dit) =  ^ ( A t  -  A .) 2 -  0.083104449
i,t
and
n 1  T
E[Var(A(|i)] =  -  T f e  T ( A t  -  A .)2) =  0.082955403.n z ' 1 z '2=1 t= 1
Again, this amount is very close to zero. Also, the variance of accident 
occurrence is explained 99.82% by the first argument of the identity.
For one more complementary work, I implement the same procedure using 
additional data. In the same data set [A], I select those who bought insurance 
contracts repeatedly over 3 years (1998-2000). I have 63,376 policyholders 
in this group. The result using this sample displays the similar result.
Var(Af) =  T  A t -  D . . f  =  0.074124326
i,t
and
1  n ^  T
E[Var(Ad*)] =  -  2 j ( y  E ( A <  -  A .)2) =  0.074063946.
2=1 t= 1
Again, this amount is very close to zero. Also, the variance of accident 
occurrence is explained 99.92% by the first argument of the identity.
Further, it may be interesting to see whether there is a difference among 
young drivers (possibly, due to the lack of driving experience). Thus, I 
compute what I have done before for young drivers. I have 2,019 policyholders 
who repeatedly purchased over [4] contract years




E[Var(AiW] = -  T b  _  A  )2) =  0-081816357.
71 i= 1 t=l
The variance of accident occurrence is explained 99.88% by the first ar­
gument of the identity.
Also, I have 6,951 policyholders who repeatedly purchased over [3] con­
tract years (1999-2001)
Var( D i t ) =  T  ^ ( D u -  D . . f  =  0.104527981
z,i
and
1 n 1 T
E[Var(Di(|i)] =  ~  ~  D i =  0-104465544.
1=1 t= 1
The variance of accident occurrence is explained 99.94% by the first ar­
gument of the identity.
Further, there are 9,755 policyholders who repeatedly purchased over [3] 
contract years (1998-2000)
Var(D i t ) =  T  t ~  D - f  =  0.092301588
i,t
and
1  n i  T
E[Var(AtN)] =  -  ~  Dit ~  =  0-092299402- .
2=1 i=1
Again, this amount is very close to zero. Also, the variance of accident 
occurrence is explained 99.99% by the first argument of the identity.
From the results, we could state that there can be no adverse selection 
problem on the risk.
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4-4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have examined the existence of asymmetric information in 
the car insurance market.
Firstly, different from the conventional approach, I have investigated 
the existence of moral hazard phenomenon through the particular contract 
choice. So far, most research has focused on the relationship between con­
tract choice and ex-post accident occurrence. Then, with this line of enquiry, 
it is feasible to identify the existence asymmetric information only using the 
conditional correlation method. In my own work here, it has been possible 
to focus on the moral hazard problem separately even in the static frame­
work. Using the simple theoretical prediction, I have analysed whether the 
purchase of the particular coverage covering my own car damage increases in 
the car values under the hypothesis of no moral hazard. It appears that, in 
the Korean market, this purchase is more or less uniform in every cell that I 
have estimated; thus, likely to reject the null hypothesis.
Secondly, I also separately test for the existence of differences in the pol­
icyholder risk level (the main cause of adverse selection) in the car insurance 
market. I have attempted to find out whether there is a difference in policy­
holder accident probability using conditional variance identity. W ith access 
to the repeated cross sectional data I have computed the relevant quantities 
in the identity and have discovered tha t the variance of accident occurrence 
across policyholders and time is very unlikely to be attributed to the differ­
ences in policyholders.
Overall, my findings seem to be consistent with other results from em­
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pirical contract theory using car insurance data sets (see Chiappori [2000]). 
Most of them suggest that adverse selection may be no longer a problem 
by introducing very sophisticated prior screening devices. However, some 
research has detected the presence of moral hazard, which is the case here in 
my work.
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C h a p t e r  5
C o n c l u s i o n
This thesis has investigated the presence of asymmetric information in the car 
insurance market using [2] panel data sets obtained from [2] leading insurance 
companies in Korea,
In the first chapter, I have attempted to fit my data set to the lead­
ing empirical strategies proposed within the field of empirical insurance eco­
nomics. Initially, I have implemented the conditional correlation approach; 
from this work I have obtained fairly interesting results: unlike most research 
that adopts similar methods, I have discovered evidence for the presence of 
asymmetric information in this static framework. T hat is, it turns out that 
there is a positive correlation between contract choice and accident occur­
rence controlling for observable characteristics. Secondly, with regards to dy­
namic empirical contract theory, I have implemented occurrence dependence 
methodology. In this work I discovered the negative occurrence dependence 
phenomenon that is different from the findings of no moral hazard by the 
original authors. Finally, I have implemented a model based on Granger 
causality. This methodology has been made possible with a panel data set.
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In accordance with the original authors, I have found evidence for the pres­
ence of dynamic moral hazard. Also, regarding contemporaneous asymmetric 
information, my results are consistent with the initial research where I also 
discovered the presence of asymmetric information. Overall, considering all 
the implementations, I have consistently discovered evidence for the pres­
ence of asymmetric information in the static framework, and evidence of the 
dynamic moral hazard in the dynamic framework.
In the second chapter, I have investigated the effects of the introduction of 
a stronger incentive system on the policyholder behaviour. As seen from the 
results by logit and non-parametric estimations, there was no such a change in 
accident occurrence before and after the introduction of the new regulation. 
In this respect, I may conclude that there is no such a phenomenon as moral 
hazard in the car insurance market. However, some may question whether 
the premium increase due to traffic law violations has been set high enough to 
induce changes in driver behaviour: That is the amount of premium increase 
due to traffic law violations in the new regulation may simply have not been 
effective on policyholder behaviour at all. Consequently there was a review, 
and an enhancement for this incentive system in 2005. Thus, there will be 
a further opportunity to reinvestigate the impact of this sort of exogenous 
institutional change in the future.
In the third chapter, and quite different from the previous approaches, I 
have investigated the presence of the moral hazard phenomenon that utilises 
particular contract choice. Based on a simple theoretical prediction, I have 
examined whether the purchase of particular coverage for own car damage in­
creases in car value under the hypothesis of no moral hazard. It appears that
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this purchase is more or less uniform in the distribution of car value, for every 
cell that I have estimated using bounds approach. Therefore, it is likely for 
the moral hazard phenomenon to exist in the car insurance market. Adverse 
selection is due to unobservable differences in risk levels across policyholders. 
Thus, secondly, I test for the existence of differences in policyholder risk level 
in the car insurance market. I have attem pted to find out whether there is 
a difference in policyholder accident probability using conditional variance 
identity. W ith access to the repeated cross sectional data, I have computed 
the relevant quantities in the identity and have discovered that the variance 
of accident occurrence across policyholders and time is very unlikely to be 
attributed to the unobservable differences amongst policyholders.
Overall, apart from the ambiguous results in chapter [2], I have, through­
out this thesis, generated findings that seem to be consistent in the sense that 
I have discovered the existence of asymmetrical information and, further, the 
presence of moral hazard. These results are also more or less consistent with 
existing research. Particularly, within the context of insurance economics, 
most research has discovered evidence of moral hazard but not adverse se­
lection.
The natural direction of future research would necessitate a fully struc­
tural estimation in the dynamic context. Since I have access to a panel 
data set, this work is likely to be addressed. Particularly, within this agenda, 
contract/effort choice needs to be explicitly incorporated: and further, an un­
derlying unobserved heterogeneity would be considered in a more direct ap­
proach. Overall, the main aim is to quantify the moral hazard phenomenon. 
So far, most research has focused on detecting the presence of asymmetric in­
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formation in the various market contexts. Even though the above constitutes 
original path breaking works, it may be the time to measure the magnitude 
of the asymmetric information. With all these developments future research 
will have good opportunity to design fairer and safer contracts for use in our 
everyday lives.
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A p p e n d i x  A
A .l  Empirical Results for Occurrence Dependence
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Pr(A =  Aa) 0.9728(0.0911)













number of observations by number of claims
Mo,n(no claims) 172766
A /i>n(l claim) 18366








Tab. A.2: Discrete heterogeneity; 12 time intervals (2000 A)
o c c u r r e n c e d e p e n d e n c e
0 0 . 0 8 0 0 ( 0 . 0 0 3 9 )
u n o b s e r v e d  h e t e r o g e n e i t y
A" 0 . 0 0 1 0 ( 0 . 0 0 9 4 )
Ah 2 . 4 8 8 5 ( 0 . 2 2 1 4 )
P r ( A  =  An ) 0 . 8 8 8 1 ( 0 . 1 0 0 7 )
P r ( A  =  A6 ) 0 . 1 1 1 9 ( 0 . 1 0 0 7 )
p i e c e w i s e  c o n s t a n t  tl>
i>i 2 . 9 0 2 0 ( 0 . 1 0 2 5 )
i>2 1 . 7 8 5 7 ( 0 . 0 6 5 0 )
i>3 1 . 3 4 8 7 ( 0 . 0 5 6 8 )
i/m 1 . 0 7 8 9 ( 0 . 0 5 4 5 )
0 . 9 1 7 2 ( 0 . 0 5 0 0 )
4>a 0 . 7 8 6 3 ( 0 . 0 4 5 5 )
ip7 0 . 6 8 9 4 ( 0 . 0 4 1 7 )
•08 0 . 6 0 7 9 ( 0 . 0 3 8 6 )
lp0 0 . 5 3 8 5 ( 0 . 0 3 6 4 )
'010 0 . 4 8 9 6 ( 0 . 0 3 3 5 )
4>ii 0 . 4 5 5 7 ( 0 . 0 3 1 7 )
n u m b e r  o f  o b s c r v a t i o r s  b y  n u m b e r  o f  c l a i m s
M o , n ( n o  c l a i m s ) 1 9 4 3 0 3
M 1 . n  (1 c l a i m ) 2 0 2 6 0
M 2 . „ ( 2  c l a i m s ) 1 8 5 0
A /3 . n ( 3 c l a i m s ) 2 3 0
A / , i .n (4  c l a i m s ) 3 5
M 5 n  (5  c l a i m s ) 6
M(l,n (6  c l a i m s ) 2
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Pr(A =  A“) 0.9547(0.0598)

















0^3,n (3 claims) 763
004,n (4 claims) 168
log-likelihood -160000
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A. 2 The Distribution of Random Terms in Dynamic Bivariate 
Probit
A .2.1 T he distribution of random  term s
We can formulate the probability as follows 1:
“ d ^d
Pl , l P i,2
? 2 ,1 ^2,2
Therefore,
P i j = prob(u;d =  ujld and ujn =  ujJn) =
exp (aitj) 2
J - - W d uu U, - U , n j -  E E e x p ( a .^
Here, we normalize =  0. 
Therefore, we have
Ppi =  p r o b ^  = a)\ and con =  w*) =
1 +  exp(<aij2) +  exp(a2,i) +  exp(cr2)2) 
By the same logic,
-pv , I  2 1 In e x p ( a i  2 )P i>2 =  prob(u;d =  u d and ujn =  u n) =  — ------   —-------  —------   r1 +  exp(<ai 2) +  exp(a2 i) +  exp(a;2!2)
T3 i / i j 2n exp(a2 i)P2,1 =  prob(cjd =  ujd and u n = u n) 1 +  exp (a ij2) +  exp(<a2ji) +  exp(<a2;2)
case.
2
1This is an example for 4 mass points. It can be easily extended to multi-dimensional 
This formula is widely used to make sure th a t a probability lies between 0 and 1.
I l l
2 j 2n e x p ( a 2,2)P 2 2 =  problem — ujh and u n = ujn) — ----------------------------- r----------  r
1 +  exp(o 'i)2) +  exp(o'2>i) +  exP(a 2,2)
Here, we have to estimate three arguments {<ai,2, «2,i, ^2,2}- 
A. 2.2 N orm alization
We normalize — (0, 0). In this case, we need to estim ate cj% and co\.
Therefore, overall we have to estimate {an,2, <T2,i5 a 2,2^ d ^ n }
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A. 3 Empirical Results for Granger Causality
A .3.1 Variables List
variable name description
GEN gender of the policyholder (1 — female)
MS marital status (1 =  not married)
CAGE1 car production year before 1993
CAGE2 car production year between 1993 and 1994
CAGE3 car production year between 1995 and 1996
CAGE4 car production year after 1996
AGE1 age younger than 30
AGE2 age 30 - 39
AGE3 age 40 - 49
AGE4 age 50 - 59
AGE5 age older than 59
CON insurance coverage (1 — comprehensive)




INICON initial value of CON
INICLA initial value of CLA
INIBM initial value of BM
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A .3.2 E stim ation  R esults
Tab. A.4: BUSAN
Variables coverage claims
GEN 0.3718 (0.1592) 0.1660 (0.0573)
MS -0.2506 (0.1900) 0.0085 (0.0525)
CAGE1 0.2037 (0.2599) -0.4896 (0.1045)
CAGE2 0.1879 (0.1969) -0.3113 (0.0653)
CAGE3 0.1381 (0.3948) -0.1673 (0.0545)
AGE1 0.5774 (0.1930) 0.0615 (0.1086)
AGE2 -0.2968 (0.2470) -0.0764 (0.0588)
AGE4 -0.1907 (0.4079) 0.0162 (0.0629)
AGE5 0.1146 (0.9997) 0.1048 (0.0732)
CONS -0.5356 (0.4828) -1.3407 (0.1566)
Predetermined
LAGCON 3.6628 (0.2993) 0.3752 (0.3095)
LAGCLA -0.1334 (1.1791) 0.2659 (0.0861)
BM -0.2229 (0.5809) -0.0066 (0.1735)
Initial Conditions
INICON 0.6832 (0.2672) -0.2186 (0.2948)
INICLA -0.1747 (1.1966) 0.0007 (0.1146)
INIBM -1.0319 (0.6602) -0.2115 (0.1733)
Correlation Coefficient
Rho 0.2926(0.2260)
Unobserved Heterogeneity Distribution estimate probability
(A i’Wn) (0, 0) 0.2501
(-0.0037, 0) 0.2491





GEN -0.1600 (0.1553) -0.0121 (0.0489)
MS -0.3158 (0.1031) -0.0390 (0.0396)
CAGE1 -0.2207 (0.1403) -0.2110 (0.0718)
CAGE2 -0.0678 (0.1148) -0.0448 (0.0495)
CAGE3 0.2547 (0.1561) 0.1965 (0.0434)
AGE1 0.6791 (0.1735) 0.0104 (0.0808)
AGE2 0.1735 (0.1100) 0.0865 (0.0416)
AGE4 0.1195 (0.2789) -0.0895 (0.0569)
AGE5 -0.2753 (0.2463) -0.0346 (0.0795)
CONS -0.7107 (0.2066) -1.5558 (0.1180)
Predetermined
LAGCON 3.0198 (0.1650) 0.2837 (0.1599)
LAGCLA -0.5175 (0.1355) -0.0581 (0.0593)
BM -0.7503 (0.3676) 0.4100 (0.0917)
Initial Conditions
INICON 0.8998 (0.1627) -0.0210 (0.1465)
INICLA 0.6664 (1.2348) -0.0103 (0.0602)
INIBM 0.1081 (0.2975) -0.2905 (0.0969)
Correlation Coefficient
Rho 0.1318 (0.1652)








GEN -0.1720 (0.1451) 0.0915 (0.0529)
MS -0.4232 (0.1411) 0.0386 (0.0501)
CAGE1 -0.4211 (0.2387) -0.5524 (0.0766)
CAGE2 0.0138 (0.1650) -0.2026 (0.0549)
CAGE3 -0.1746 (0.1885) -0.1117 (0.0491)
AGE1 -0.1426 (0.2020) -0.1541 (0.0885)
AGE2 -0.0261 (0.1360) -0.1978 (0.0504)
AGE4 -0.3480 (0.2185) -0.0689 (0.0544)
AGE5 -0.2516 (0.8403) -0.1146 (0.0832)
CONS -1.0963 (0.3142) -1.5896 (0.1453)
Predetermined
LAGCON 2.8964 (0.2504) 0.5292 (0.1989)
LAGCLA 0.9475 (0.3232) 0.1855 (0.0577)
BM -0.0172 (0.5041) -0.1182 (0.1076)
Initial Conditions
INICON 1.1990 (0.2815) -0.0100 (0.1739)
INICLA -0.0761 (0.5015) -0.1602 (0.0675)
INIBM 0.6168 (0.4755) 0.1415 (0.1137)
Correlation Coefficient
Rho 0.1862 (0.1681)






Tab. A.7: KYUNGGI PROVINCE
Variables coverage claims
GEN -0.1040 (0.0679) 0.1148 (0.0271)
MS -0.2411 (0.0580) -0.1994 (0.0233)
CAGE1 -0.3658 (0.1020) -0.2705 (0.0403)
CAGE2 -0.1230 (0.0887) -0.0913 (0.0292)
CAGE3 0.0808 (0.0777) -0.0799 (0.0264)
AGE1 -0.2343 (0.0923) 0.1433 (0.0462)
AGE2 0.2820 (0.0721) -0.0067 (0.0261)
AGE4 -0.0070 (0.0843) 0.1079 (0.0322)
AGE5 -0.1216 (0.1208) 0.2237 (0.0406)
CONS -0.8152 (0.1535) -1.6472 (0.0721)
Predetermined
LAGCON 3.3329 (0.1330) 0.5451 (0.1112)
LAGCLA -0.2784 (0.0916) 0.0496 (0.0341)
BM -0.0377 (0.2099) 0.0136 (0.0692)
Initial Conditions
INICON 0.5535 (0.1357) -0.0304 (0.0990)
INICLA 0.0211 (0.1023) 0.1278 (0.0371)
INIBM -0.1463 (0.2197) 0.0221 (0.0694)
Correlation Coefficient
Rho 0.2148 (0.0645)
Unobserved Heterogeneity Distribution estimate probability
i ^ d ^ n ) (0, 0) 0.2502
( “ W n ) (0.0008, 0) 0.25
( ^ > n ) (0, -0.0009) 0.2499
^ > 1 ) (0.0008, -0.0009) 0.2499
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Tab. A.8: KYUNGNAM PROVINCE
Variables coverage claims
GEN 1.1249 (0.1891) 0.0877 (0.0576)
MS 0.0990 (0.2532) 0.0534 (0.0492)
CAGE1 -0.4108 (0.2619) -0.3579 (0.0863)
CAGE2 -0.1085 (0.2314) -0.1920 (0.0542)
CAGE3 -0.2316 (0.2325) -0.2131 (0.0507)
AGE1 0.6521 (0.2447) 0.0971 (0.0780)
AGE2 0.0301 (0.1807) 0.0304 (0.0523)
AGE4 0.2905 (0.2180) 0.0958 (0.0584)
AGE5 -0.1229 (0.8437) -0.1385 (0.1029)
CONS -0.0947 (0.3610) -1.9264 (0.5717)
Predetermined
LAGCON 3.1647 (0.4891) -0.3506 (0.9710)
LAGCLA -0.0534 (0.4264) 0.0101 (0.0737)
BM -1.2270 (0.6208) 0.3806 (0.1477)
Initial Conditions
INICON 1.1207 (0.5149) 0.8633 (0.9764)
INICLA -0.3085 (0.4370) -0.0308 (0.0759)
INIBM -0.5954 (0.6445) -0.1149 (0.1621)
Correlation Coefficient
Rho 0.2451 (0.1574)




i ^ l ) (0, 0.0088) 0.2502
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Tab. A.9: KYUNGBUK PROVINCE
Variables coverage claims
GEN 0.0788 (0.1168) 0.2001 (0.0410)
MS -0.1785 (0.1381) 0.0038 (0.0390)
CAGE1 -0.4642 (0.1817) -0.3693 (0.0641)
CAGE2 -0.4361 (0.1203) -0.1295 (0.0407)
CAGE3 -0.3162 (0.1268) -0.1496 (0.0390)
AGE1 -0.0044 (0.1360) -0.1650 (0.0700)
AGE2 0.0936 (0.1205) -0.0164 (0.0400)
AGE4 -0.0610 (0.1332) 0.1367 (0.0452)
AGE5 0.1363 (0.1930) 0.1849 (0.0516)
CONS -0.7203 (0.2721) -1.5202 (0.1031)
Predetermined
LAGCON 3.9003 (0.2092) 0.1369 (0.2859)
LAGCLA 0.2859 (0.1659) 0.1630 (0.0558)
BM -0.4883 (0.3127) -0.1842 (0.1160)
Initial Conditions
INICON 0.1686 (0.2105) 0.0878 (0.2788)
INICLA 0.0569 (0.2776) 0.0553 (0.0681)
INIBM -0.0627 (0.3581) 0.1163 (0.1140)
Correlation Coefficient
Rho 0.2505 (0.1318)






Tab. A. 10: JUNNAM PROVINCE
Variables coverage claims
GEN 0.3740 (0.1930) 0.0784 (0.0516)
MS -0.6215 (0.1223) -0.2200 (0.0459)
CAGE1 -0.0868 (0.1650) -0.4393 (0.0949)
CAGE2 -0.0942 (0.2064) -0.0816 (0.0557)
CAGE3 -0.1261 (0.1311) -0.0785 (0.0477)
AGE1 0.4318 (0.2027) 0.0164 (0.0821)
AGE2 0.0997 (0.1509) -0.1334 (0.0491)
AGE4 -0.4918 (0.1663) -0.0405 (0.0593)
AGE5 -0.1855 (0.1846) -0.2952 (0.0861)
CONS 0.1797 (0.2358) -1.7636 (0.1368)
Predetermined
LAGCON 2.9345 (0.1867) 0.5166 (0.1658)
LAGCLA 0.3087 (0.5202) 0.2682 (0.0680)
BM -0.2465 (0.2925) -0.1951 (0.1533)
Initial Conditions
INICON 0.9988 (0.2260) -0.1013 (0.1355)
INICLA -0.2991 (0.3280) 0.1819 (0.0706)
INIBM -0.5820 (0.2973) 0.3928 (0.1505)
Correlation Coefficient
Rho -0.1603 (0.1229)
Unobserved Heterogeneity Distribution estimate probability
(0, 0) 0.2494




Tab. A. 11: JUNBUK PROVINCE
Variables coverage claims
GEN -0.1274 (0.1560) 0.0823 (0.0591)
MS -0.4173 (0.1733) -0.0212 (0.0535)
CAGE1 -0.5785 (0.2689) -0.1280 (0.0907)
CAGE2 -0.1789 (0.1670) -0.0578 (0.0635)
CAGE3 -0.0196 (0.1596) -0.0207 (0.0561)
AGE1 0.9498 (0.2151) -0.0240 (0.1065)
AGE2 0.4387 (0.1277) -0.0581 (0.0538)
AGE4 0.3953 (0.1825) -0.1130 (0.0645)
AGE5 0.0313 (0.5787) 0.1020 (0.0704)
CONS -0.6887 (0.4083) -1.7815 (0.1437)
Predetermined
LAGCON 2.9796 (0.2869) 1.0128 (0.1801)
LAGCLA 0.2550 (0.3610) 0.0456 (0.0823)
BM -0.7628 (0.7253) 0.2323 (0.1542)
Initial Conditions
INICON 1.2113 (0.3266) -0.5772 (0.1536)
INICLA -0.0995 (0.6425) -0.0380 (0.1010)
INIBM 0.0298 (0.7797) -0.0872 (0.1505)
Correlation Coefficient
Rho 0.6134 (0.1302)
Unobserved Heterogeneity Distribution estimate probability
( ^ ) (0, 0) 0.2505
(-0.0005, 0) 0.2498
(0, -0.0001) 0.2499
("WJ (-0.0005, -0.0001) 0.2498
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Tab. A. 12: CHUNGNAM PROVINCE
Variables coverage claims
GEN -0.0063 (0.1511) 0.0579 (0.0563)
MS 0.2001 (0.1326) -0.0895 (0.0543)
CAGE1 -0.2130 (0.1707) -0.3191 (0.0760)
CAGE2 -0.2174 (0.1452) -0.1737 (0.0582)
CAGE3 0.3116 (0.1446) -0.1906 (0.0526)
AGE1 -0.5801 (0.1543) -0.1528 (0.0860)
AGE2 -0.1158 (0.1445) -0.2301 (0.0569)
AGE4 -0.1440 (0.1895) -0.0990 (0.0575)
AGE5 -0.5151 (0.1655) -0.2044 (0.0787)
CONS -0.5221 (0.2789) -1.2423 (0.1166)
Predetermined
LAGCON 2.9930 (0.1900) 0.3708 (0.1473)
LAGCLA 0.4855 (0.2446) -0.0896 (0.0681)
BM 0.6756 (0.4014) 0.1745 (0.1344)
Initial Conditions
INICON 0.9609 (0.1950) -0.3055 (0.1334)
INICLA -0.6998 (0.3067) 0.3123 (0.0725)
INIBM -1.4199 (0.4172) -0.0136 (0.1186)
Correlation Coefficient
Rho 0.1364 (0.0658)
Unobserved Heterogeneity Distribution estimate probability
(0, 0) 0.25
(0.0003, 0) 0.25
d ><;.) (0, 0.0002) 0.25
( ^ , ) (0.0003, 0.0002) 0.25
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Tab. A. 13: CHUNGBUK PROVINCE
Variables coverage claims
GEN 0.2459 (0.2988) -0.0741 (0.0691)
MS 0.1248 (0.1767) -0.0705 (0.0564)
CAGE1 0.2930 (0.3067) -0.2618 (0.0860)
CAGE2 -0.2427 (0.2138) -0.0742 (0.0660)
CAGE3 -0.0423 (0.2225) 0.0436 (0.0587)
AGE1 -0.2375 (0.2489) -0.0027 (0.0965)
AGE2 1.0323 (0.2096) 0.0400 (0.0611)
AGE4 -0.0922 (0.1752) 0.0386 (0.0728)
AGE5 0.0465 (0.6291) 0.3366 (0.0866)
CONS -1.0291 (0.3016) -1.3870 (0.1553)
Predetermined
LAGCON 2.4543 (0.2307) 0.6114 (0.2336)
LAGCLA 0.7821 (0.1945) -0.1387 (0.0870)
BM -1.3647 (0.4132) 0.6712 (0.1417)
Initial Conditions
INICON 1.8032 (0.2642) -0.4856 (0.2187)
INICLA -0.1460 (0.2322) -0.3535 (0.1057)
INIBM 0.1013 (0.3955) -0.5747 (0.1564)
Correlation Coefficient
Rho 0.2520 (0.1959)







































































Tab. A. 15: GANGWQN PROVINCE
Variables coverage claims
GEN 0.3055 (0.2231) -0.2234 (0.1114)
MS -0.0727 (0.2528) -0.3897 (0.0827)
CAGE1 0.2911 (0.2630) -0.1311 (0.1446)
CAGE2 0.1111 (0.3220) -0.0303 (0.1141)
CAGE3 0.3595 (0.1550) 0.1664 (0.0949)
AGE1 -0.1354 (0.2009) 0.1104 (0.0895)
AGE4 -0.2078 (0.3037) 0.0495 (0.1057)
AGE5 0.0721 (0.2313) 0.1662 (0.1209)
CONS -1.0351 (0.3921) -1.6167 (0.2152)
Predetermined
LAGCON 3.4504 (0.4897) 0.1416 (0.3025)
LAGCLA 0.4405 (0.4990) 0.1431 (0.1495)
BM -0.0860 (0.6562) -0.3180 (0.3929)
Initial Conditions
INICON 0.7193 (0.4532) 0.1082 (0.2775)
INICLA 1.2783 (1.0723) 0.0733 (0.1728)
INIBM -0.4060 (0.5675) 0.2088 (0.3113)
Correlation Coefficient
Rho -0.3024 (0.6094)
Unobserved Heterogeneity Distribution estimate probability
(0, 0) 0.2494
(wd>wn) (-0.0002, 0) 0.2502
(0, -0.0006) 0.2502
( K X ) (-0.0002, -0.0006) 0.2502
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A p p e n d i x  B
B .l Subgroup Classification
Tab. B .l: Subgroup Classification A
Name Description
MS Male and Seoul Metropolitan City
MK Male and Kyeongsang and Jeju Province
MKI Male and Kyeonggi Province
MCJ Male and Chungcheong/Jeolla/Gangwon Province
FS Female and Seoul Metropolitan City
FK Female and Kyeongsang and Jeju Province
FKI Female and Kyeonggi Province
FCJ Female and Clmngcheong/Jeolla/Gangwon Province
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Tab. B.2: Subgroup Classification B
Name Description
MMS Male and Married and Seoul Metropolitan City
MMK Male and Married and Kyeongsang Province
MMC Male and Married and Clmngcheong
MMJ Male and Married and Jeolla/Gangwon Province
MMI Male and Married and Kyeonggi Province
MuMS Male and Not Married and Seoul Metropolitan City
MuMK Male and Not Married and Kyeongsang Province
MuMC Male and Not Married and Chungcheong
MUMJ Male and Not Married and Jeolla/Gangwon Province
MUMI Male and Not Married and Kyeonggi Province
FMS Female and Married and Seoul Metropolitan City
FMK Female and Married and Kyeongsang Province
FMC Female and Married and Chungcheong Province
FMJ Female and Married and Jeolla/Gangwon Province
FMI Female and Married and Kyeonggi Province
FuMS Female and Not Married and Seoul Metropolitan City
FuMK Female and Not Married and Kyeongsang Province
FuMC Female and Not Married and Chuncheong Province
FuMJ Female and Not Married and Jeolla/Gangwon Province




Tab. B.3: Overall Results B
LOGIT 1999 2000 2001
MMS -1.891289 0.116) -1.95818 (0.119) -1.96361 0.119)
MMK -2.548328 0.160) -1.991781 (0.127) -2.261763 0.142)
MMC -2.358155 0.177) -2.427748 (0.182) -2.112964 0.160)
MMJ -2.691243 0.211) -2.400824 (0.188) -2.091563 0.166)
MMI -2.177047 0.112) -2.069185 (0.107) -2.062891 0.107)
MuMS -2.101484 0.093) -2.116737 (0.095) -2.128038 0.095)
MuMK -2.295782 0.097) -2.232439 (0.094) -2.122305 0.090)
MuMC -2.35601 0.116) -2.442347 (0.120) -2.267133 0.111)
MuMJ -3.028522 0.187) -2.421625 (0.143) -2.496741 0.149)
MuMI -2.051619 0.083) -2.224056 (0.088) -2.207003 0.087)
FMS -1.680897 0.210) -2.04122 (0.238) -2.098986 0.243)
FMK -2.531427 0.393) -1.58412 (0.274) -1.742969 0.290)
FMC -1.667707 0.345) -2.097141 (0.401) -1.386294 0.310)
FM J -3.314186 0.720) -2.322388 (0.469) -2.564949 0.519)
FMI -1.94591 0.223) -1.89085 (0.219) -1.441864 0.188)
FuMS -2.072473 0.177) -2.0131 (0.175) -2.0131 0.175)
FuMK -2.184802 0.203) -2.752864 (0.258) -2.054124 0.194)
FuMC -2.085107 0.226) -1.951608 (0.214) -1.857455 0.207)
FuMJ -3.654978 0.585) -2.09849 (0.294) -1.926679 0.276)
FuMI -2.038056 0.175) -1.91482 (0.165) -1.90176 0.163)
(standard errors in parenthesis)
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Tab. B.4: Overall Results B
Nonparametric 1999 2000 2001
MMS 0.12621 0.13386 0.12687
MMK 0.10459 0.11637 0.11146
MMC 0.10056 0.09912 0.11208
MMJ 0.07448 0.08366 0.10329
MMI 0.11549 0.12518 0.12614
MuMS 0.11102 0.11289 0.11973
MuMK 0.08791 0.10148 0.10774
MuMC 0.10321 0.09819 0.11286
MUMJ 0.06900 0.08588 0.08378
MUMI 0.12942 0.11840 0.12091
FMS 0.16578 0.13121 0.14801
FMK 0.12760 0.18229 0.14805
FMC 0.12054 0.15351 0.16450
FM J 0.08658 0.10965 0.10132
FMI 0.17684 0.16220 0.16485
FuMS 0.12018 0.13283 0.13832
FuMK 0.11005 0.09958 0.11979
FuMC 0.10445 0.11963 0.14992
FuMJ 0.05339 0.10408 0.11157
FuMI 0.12903 0.13656 0.14224
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A p p e n d i x  C
C.l Contract Choices in Data B
Tab .C. l :  Tabulation of Coverage Choices
cover Freq Percent Cum
100000 97,458 21.78 21.78
100050 66 0.01 21.80
100400 4 0.00 21.80
103000 71 0.02 21.82
103050 19 0.00 21.82
103400 3 0.00 21.82
120000 1,325 0.30 22.12
120050 52 0.01 22.13
120400 3 0.00 22.13
120450 1 0.00 22.13
123000 25,031 5.60 27.72
123050 46,831 10.47 38.19
123056 93,598 20.92 59.11
123400 468 0.10 59.22
123450 1,362 0.30 59.52




















C.3 Results for Female Policyholders
Tab. C.3: Female/capital city areas/-1994/<1000CC/m anual
Quantile Lower Upper
10th quantile KW 607,192 (£262)
20th  quantile KW 708,851 (£306)
30th quantile KW 508,744 (£220) KW 819,132 (£353)
40th quantile KW 658,487 (£284) KW 954,459 (£412)
50th quantile KW 754,039 (£325) KW 1,081,652 (£467)
60th quantile KW 882,929 (£381) KW 1,237,990 (£534)
70th quantile KW 1,013,378 (£437) KW 1,439,347 (£621)
80th quantile KW 1,147,963 (£495)
90th quantile KW 1,319,680 (£569)
Tab. C.4: Frequency of Purchasing Coverage 4
Values (£) Lower Values (£) Upper
220 -  284 21 -  262 21
284 -  325 26 262 -  306 25
325 -  381 30 306 -  353 29
381 -  437 18 353 -  412 19
437 -  495 25 412 -  467 34
495 -  569 30 467 -  534 17
569 - 21 534 -  621 26
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KW 1,042,988 (£450) 
KW 1,712,218 (£739) 
KW 2,299,035 (£992) 
KW 2,826,925 (£1,220) 
KW 3,260,529 (£1,407) 
KW 3,678,075 (£1,587) 
KW 4,157,914 (£1,794) 
KW 4,983,286 (£2,150)
KW 1,546,802 (£667) 
KW 2,122,291 (£916) 
KW 2,692,283 (£1,162) 
KW 3,141,151 (£1,355) 
KW 3,557,967 (£1,535) 
KW 4,007,187 (£1,729) 
KW 4,665,008 (£2,013) 
KW 6,950,332 (£2,999)
Tab. C.6: Frequency of Purchasing Coverage 4
Values (£) Lower Values (£) Upper
450 -  739 44 -  667 44
739 -  992 44 667 -  916 47
992 -  1,220 46 916 -  1,162 36
1,220 -  1,407 48 1,162 -  1,355 52
1,407 -  1,587 36 1,355 -  1,535 35
1,587 -  1,794 50 1,535 -  1,729 60
1,794 -  2,150 50 1,729 -  2,013 44
2,150 - 38 2,013 -  2,999 39
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KW 4,414,477 (£1,905) 
KW 4,965,378 (£2,143) 
KW 5,444,410 (£2,349) 
KW 5,894,911 (£2,544) 
KW 6,374,397 (£2,751) 
KW 6,960,765 (£3,004) 
KW 7,674,395 (£3,312) 
KW 8,595,935 (£3,709)
KW 4,600,152 (£1,985) 
KW 5,114,550 (£2,207) 
KW 5,581,120 (£2,408) 
KW 6,033,875 (£2,604) 
KW 6,535,765 (£2,820) 
KW 7,167,016 (£3,093) 
KW 7,912,070 (£3,414) 
KW 9,056,561 (£3,908)
Tab. C.8: Frequency of Purchasing Coverage 4
Values (£) Lower Values (£) Upper
1,905 -  2,143 96 -  1,985 82
2,143 -  2,349 80 1,985 -  2,207 77
2,349 -  2,544 88 2,207 -  2,408 78
2,544 -  2,751 82 2,408 -  2,604 89
2,751 -  3,004 77 2,604 -  2,820 89
3,004 -  3,312 77 2,820 -  3,093 72
3,312 -  3,709 78 3,093 -  3,414 75
3,709 - 79 3,414 -  3,908 94
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